Theory of Solvency Regulation in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry
In: Studies in Public Regulation
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- Paul L. Joskow, 1973. "Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(2), pages 375-427, Autumn.
- James H. Scott Jr., 1976. "A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 33-54, Spring.
- Patricia Munch & Dennis E. Smallwood, 1980. "Solvency Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: Empirical Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 261-279, Spring.
- Michael C. Jensen, 1972. "Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 3(2), pages 357-398, Autumn.
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