The Shadow Economy and Morals: A Note
If the established rules are obeyed spontaneously in an economy, this increases economic efficiency since the uncertainties, monitoring costs and incentive problems induced by opportunism can be avoided. Opportunism will be increasedby increasing the incentives for unlawful behaviour, however, and a slight increase in these incentives might cause a cumulative and self-nourishing breakdown of morals. The dangers of the growing shadow economy are louring here.
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- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1980.
"Reference Group Behaviour and Economic Incentives,"
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics
35691, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November.
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, .
"Cognitive Dissonance in Economics,"
Chapters in Economics,
University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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