Conditionality Revisited : Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons
This volume illustrates many questions around the different donor approaches to conditionality remain controversial. How relevant is the number of conditions? Is ex ante or ex post conditionality more conducive as a mutual commitment device? How can budget support be more predictable-by focusing conditions on specific policy actions or on outcomes? How can risks be managed, and what is the optimal risk and failure rate of conditions and programs? Ex post conditionality based on completed actions provides an alternative to traditional ex ante conditionality that promises to be more flexible and more supportive of government ownership. It is at the core of the programmatic approach to policy-based lending that has increasingly become the World Bank's choice to support medium-term reforms. Another possible design option involves
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Howard White & Oliver Morrissey, 1997. "Conditionality When Donor And Recipient Preferences Vary," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 497-505.
- Kanbur, Ravi & Sandler, Todd & Morrison, Kevin, 1999. "The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods," Staff General Research Papers 1629, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Stefan G. Koeberle, 2003. "Should Policy-Based Lending Still Involve Conditionality?," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 18(2), pages 249-273.
- James M. Boughton, 2003. "Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs," IMF Working Papers 03/191, International Monetary Fund.
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