IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/b/cvv/eslbks/978-625-6861-89-3.html

Critical Essays on Politics Vol.2

Author

Listed:
  • Jan-Erik Lane

    (University of Geneva, Switzerland)

Abstract

This book consists of 6 chapters on Social Theory. It is possible to briefly summarize the content of these chapters. The neo-institutionalisr theory on the management of common pool resources by states in erms of international regimes is based on dubious a.ssumptions about sues as players. If one starts from alternaiive assumptions about interaciion between asymmetrical players and the advantages of opportunistic behaviour, then it is easier to account for !he collective action difficulties in a regime such as the Helsinki Commission (IIELCONI), which handles the environmental problems in the Baltic Sea region.What drives a politician? The standard answer in political philosophy is Hobbes’ power, strongly supported by Max Weber. However, the emergence of the Putin regime in Russia forces us to theorize the role of economic motivation as looting. We find it in all dictatorships, e.g., Burma. The giant financial economy enhances the private prospects of looting, especially in closed societies. The Ukraine war makes the philosophy of warfare highly relevant. But the philosophers of war are few in numbers despite the numerous war mankind has experienced. The Ukraine warfare is not rational in terms of Clausewitz’ concepts of strategy and tactics. The United Nations’ endorsed notion of good government or governance can be analysed in a clear fashion with the concepts of rule of law – rule of law I (legality) and rule of law II (democracy). Principal-agent modelling shows how politicians and the bureaucracy can be restrained by rule of law institutions.Today there is a set of well-ordered countries to which many people would liķe to move. What is their advantage? Reply: they are well-ordered im the public and private sectors adhering to the Keynesian model of a mixed economy. The wars in the Ukraine and Gaza have resulted in such enormous costs that the war approach to conflicts must be rejected. Theories of war are based on rational assumptions like with Sun Tsu and Clausewitz. Only Thucydides told the truth: cruelty, destruction and suffering. Given the destruction in Ukraine and Gaza as well as Israel, one may look into the peace literature for guidance (Balissa 2020).

Suggested Citation

  • Jan-Erik Lane, 2024. "Critical Essays on Politics Vol.2," EconSciences Library Books, EconSciences Library Books, edition 1, number 978-625-6861-89-3.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvv:eslbks:978-625-6861-89-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econsciences.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/978-625-6861-89-3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Brautigam, Deborah, 2011. "The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199606290.
    3. Stiglitz, Joseph E. & Charlton, Andrew, 2007. "Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195328790.
    4. Leif Johansen, 1979. "The Bargaining Society And The Inefficiency Of Bargaining," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 497-522, August.
    5. Wildavsky, Aaron, 1987. "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 3-21, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(1), pages 95-122, February.
    2. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    3. Matsui, Kenji, 2020. "Optimal bargaining timing of a wholesale price for a manufacturer with a retailer in a dual-channel supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(1), pages 225-236.
    4. Leonardo-Fabio Morales & Mauricio Quiñones & Eleonora Dávalos & Luis-Felipe Gaviria, 2025. "Spatial spillover effects in the labour market in a middle-income country," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 53-71, January.
    5. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2005. "Alliances and negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 128-141, March.
    6. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
    7. Mohr, Ernst, 1990. "Courts of appeal, bureaucracies and conditional project permits: The role of negotiating non-exclusive property rights over the environment," Kiel Working Papers 408, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    8. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
    9. Américo Mendes, 2005. "A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice," Game Theory and Information 0503001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    11. Steinar Holden, 1998. "Wage Drift and the Relevance of Centralised Wage Setting," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(4), pages 711-731, December.
    12. Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 56-73.
    13. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.
    14. Thomas M. Humphrey, 1996. "The early history of the box diagram," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 37-75.
    15. Élodie Bertrand, 2006. "La thèse d'efficience du « théorème de Coase ». Quelle critique de la microéconomie ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 983-1007.
    16. Norman, Peter, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.
    17. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8529 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Carlsson, Mikael & Westermark, Andreas, 2011. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 579-603, April.
    19. Dávila, J. & Eeckhout, J., 2008. "Competitive bargaining equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 269-294, March.
    20. Izat B. Baybusinov & Enrico Maria Fenoaltea & Yi-Cheng Zhang, 2022. "Negotiation problem," Papers 2201.12619, arXiv.org.
    21. Farboodi, Maryam & Jarosch, Gregor & Menzio, Guido & Wiriadinata, Ursula, 2025. "Intermediation as rent extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • Q01 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Sustainable Development
    • O44 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Environment and Growth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvv:eslbks:978-625-6861-89-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bilal KARGI (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://econsciences.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.