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Bestechung und Bomben: Korruptionsbekämpfung dient auch der nationalen Sicherheit

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  • Auer, Daniel
  • Meierrieks, Daniel

Abstract

Satte 3,6 Billionen US-Dollar jährlich gehen der Wirtschaft weltweit durch Korruption verloren – so schätzte jedenfalls UN-Generalsekretär António Guterres 2018. Doch Bestechung ist nicht nur wirtschaftlich kostspielig. Eine neue Studie zeigt, dass Korruption geradezu tödlich sein kann, denn sie führt auch zu einer Zunahme terroristischer Gewalt.

Suggested Citation

  • Auer, Daniel & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2024. "Bestechung und Bomben: Korruptionsbekämpfung dient auch der nationalen Sicherheit," WZB-Mitteilungen: Quartalsheft für Sozialforschung, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, issue 186 (4/24, pages 48-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmtn:327951
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tavares, Jose, 2003. "Does foreign aid corrupt?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 99-106, April.
    2. Meierrieks, Daniel & Auer, Daniel, 2025. "Bribes and Bombs: The Effect of Corruption on Terrorism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 670-686, May.
    3. Philippe Le Billon, 2003. "Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 413-426.
    4. Bryan Caplan, 2006. "Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 91-107, July.
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