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Does Game Theory Have A Role To Play In Policy Making In Natural Resources And The Environment?

Author

Listed:
  • FIORAVANTE PATRONE

    (Faculty of Engineering, University of Genoa, Italy)

  • JOAQUIN SANCHEZ-SORIANO

    (Operations Research Center (CIO), University Miguel Hernández of Elche, Spain)

  • ARIEL DINAR

    (Department of Environmental Sciences and Water Science and Policy Center University of California, Riverside, USA)

Abstract

This paper presents selected contributions from the 6th Meeting on Game Theory and Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources and the Environment that was held in Zaragoza (Spain) from 10 to 12 of July 2006. The dramatic increase in the application and use of game theory models for policy making in natural resources and the environment justifies the attention that is devoted to such topics. We provide examples for such applications, underlying the role they played. The contributions of the papers in this special section and the links between them are presented, together with a short synthesis of the range of contributions that are worth mentioning and would support policy making in fishery, water, and environmental regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Fioravante Patrone & Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano & Ariel Dinar, 2008. "Does Game Theory Have A Role To Play In Policy Making In Natural Resources And The Environment?," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 221-228.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:n:s021919890800190x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021919890800190X
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345, March.
    2. Parrachino, Irene & Dinar, Ariel & Patrone, Fioravante, 2006. "Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4074, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marianthi V. Podimata & Panayotis C. Yannopoulos, 2016. "A conceptual approach to model sand-gravel extraction from rivers based on a game theory perspective," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(1), pages 120-141, January.
    2. Marianna Khachaturyan & Karina Schoengold, 2019. "Applying Interconnected Game Theory to Analyze Transboundary Waters: A Case Study of the Kura–Araks Basin," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-32, January.
    3. Safa Baccour & Jose Albiac & Taher Kahil, 2021. "Cost-Effective Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Agriculture of Aragon, Spain," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(3), pages 1-19, January.
    4. Rahmoune, Mahdi & Radjef, Mohammed Said & Boukherroub, Tasseda & Carvalho, Margarida, 2024. "A new integrated cooperative game and optimization model for the allocation of forest resources," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 316(1), pages 329-340.
    5. Acosta-Vega, Rick K. & Algaba, Encarnación & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquín, 2023. "Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 777-788.
    6. Gutiérrez, E. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J. & Mosquera, M., 2018. "Sustainable allocation of greenhouse gas emission permits for firms with Leontief technologies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 269(1), pages 5-15.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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