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Sustainable coalitions in the commons

  • Luc DOYEN (CNRS - CERSP)
  • Jean-Christophe PEREAU (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113)

It is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agents’ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator.

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Paper provided by Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée in its series Cahiers du GREThA with number 2009-15.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2009-15
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  1. Stefan Baumgärtner & Martin F. Quaas, 2007. "Ecological-economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty," Working Paper Series in Economics 67, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  2. Martinet, Vincent & Thebaud, Olivier & Doyen, Luc, 2007. "Defining viable recovery paths toward sustainable fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 411-422, December.
  3. Bene, C. & Doyen, L. & Gabay, D., 2001. "A viability analysis for a bio-economic model," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 385-396, March.
  4. Burton, P.S., 2001. "Community Enforcement of Fisheries Effort Restrictions," Department of Economics at Dalhousie University working papers archive 2001-01, Dalhousie, Department of Economics.
  5. John C. V. Pezzey, 1997. "Sustainability Constraints versus "Optimality" versus Intertemporal Concern, and Axioms versus Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(4), pages 448-466.
  6. Cardaliaguet, Pierre & Quincampoix, Marc & Saint-Pierre, Patrick, 2007. "Differential games through viability theory : old and recent results," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/5561, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Béné, C. & Doyen, L., 2008. "Contribution values of biodiversity to ecosystem performances: A viability perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 14-23, December.
  8. Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos, 2008. "Coalition Formation In Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 303-317.
  9. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
  10. Sandal, Leif K. & Steinshamn, Stein I., 2004. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1781-1799, July.
  11. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
  12. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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