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Sustainable coalitions in the commons

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  • Jean-Christophe Pereau

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

It is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agents’ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2010. "Sustainable coalitions in the commons," Post-Print hal-00645728, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00645728
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    1. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5561 is not listed on IDEAS
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    12. Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos, 2008. "Coalition Formation In Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 303-317.
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    14. Béné, C. & Doyen, L., 2008. "Contribution values of biodiversity to ecosystem performances: A viability perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 14-23, December.
    15. Marko Lindroos, 2004. "Sharing The Benefits Of Cooperation In The Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(01), pages 35-53.
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    Cited by:

    1. L. Doyen & A. Cissé & S. Gourguet & L. Mouysset & P.-Y. Hardy & C. Béné & F. Blanchard & F. Jiguet & J.-C. Pereau & O. Thébaud, 2013. "Ecological-economic modelling for the sustainable management of biodiversity," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 353-364, December.
    2. Péreau, J.-C. & Doyen, L. & Little, L.R. & Thébaud, O., 2012. "The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 419-434.
    3. Doyen, L. & Martinet, V., 2012. "Maximin, viability and sustainability," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 1414-1430.
    4. L. Doyen & A. A. Cissé & N. Sanz & F. Blanchard & J.-C. Pereau, 2018. "The Tragedy of Open Ecosystems," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 117-140, March.
    5. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Lauriane Mouysset & Luc Doyen, 2018. "Groundwater Management in a Food Security Context," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(2), pages 319-336, October.
    6. CISSE Abdoul & SANZ Nicolas & BLANCHARD Fabien & DOYEN Luc & PEREAU Jean-Christophe, 2015. "The tragedy of ecosystems in open-access," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2015-02, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    7. Schuhbauer, Anna & Sumaila, U. Rashid, 2016. "Economic viability and small-scale fisheries — A review," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 69-75.
    8. Jacek Krawczyk & Alastair Pharo & Oana Serea & Stewart Sinclair, 2013. "Computation of viability kernels: a case study of by-catch fisheries," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 365-396, December.
    9. Ansink, Erik & Bouma, Jetske, 2013. "Effective support for community resource management," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 94-103.

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    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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