IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/soecon/v65y1998i1p64-82.html

Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Fredrik Carlsen

Abstract

This paper presents two tests of the rational partisan theory (RPT) of business cycles. First, I develop and test an RPT model in which wage contracts are staggered and overlapping. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on the density and duration of wage contracts and estimates of the incumbent party's election‐win probability are employed to calibrate partisan intervention variables entered in output growth regressions. Next, I perform a more “flexible” test of the RPT by comparing partisan output growth differences after elections in which the outcome was relatively surprising with partisan output growth differences after elections in which the outcome was widely anticipated. The two approaches produce the same conclusion: The RPT is not supported by the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Fredrik Carlsen, 1998. "Rational Partisan Theory: Empirical Evidence for the United States," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 64-82, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1998:i:1:p:64-82
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00128.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00128.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00128.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Sachs, Jeffrey, 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 63-82, February.
    2. Taylor, John B, 1979. "Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 108-113, May.
    3. Martin Paldam, 1991. "Politics Matter After All," International Economic Association Series, in: Niels Thygesen & Kumaraswamy Velupillai & Stefano Zambelli (ed.), Business Cycles, chapter 14, pages 369-405, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
    5. Taylor, John B, 1980. "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 1-23, February.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 663-688.
    7. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & Keech, William R, 1986. "Party Differences in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 71-74, May.
    8. Grier, Kevin B & Neiman, Howard E, 1987. "Deficits, Politics and Money Growth," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(2), pages 201-214, April.
    9. Douglas A. Hibbs, 1994. "The Partisan Model Of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory And Evidence For The United States," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 1-23, March.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Cohen, Gerald D. & Roubini, Nouriel, 1993. "Electoral business cycle in industrial democracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, March.
    11. Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-325, August.
    12. Pagan, Adrian, 1984. "Econometric Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with Generated Regressors," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 221-247, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van Lelyveld, Iman, 1999. "Inflation or unemployment? Who cares?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 463-484, September.
    2. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
    3. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
    4. Juan Carlos Berganza, 1998. "Relationships Between Politicians and Voters Through Elections: A Review Essay," Working Papers wp1998_9809, CEMFI.
    5. Brian Snowdon & Howard R. Vane, 1999. "The New Political Macroeconomics: An Interview with Alberto Alesina," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 43(1), pages 19-34, March.
    6. Ronald Schettkat & Rongrong Sun, 2009. "Monetary policy and European unemployment," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 25(1), pages 94-108, Spring.
    7. Mash, Richard, 2002. "New Keynesian Microfoundations Revisited: A Generalised Calvo-Taylor Model and the Desirability of Inflation vs. Price Level Targeting," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 138, Royal Economic Society.
    8. Taylor, J.B., 2016. "The Staying Power of Staggered Wage and Price Setting Models in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2009-2042, Elsevier.
    9. Willem H. Buiter & Ian Jewitt, 1980. "Staggered Wage Setting without Money Illusion: Variations on a Theme of Taylor," NBER Working Papers 0545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Latsos Sophia, 2018. "Real Wage Effects of Japan’s Monetary Policy," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 69(1), pages 177-215, July.
    11. Ahsan Ul Haq Satti & Wasim Shahid Malik & Ghulam Saghir, 2007. "New Keynesian Phillips Curve for Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 46(4), pages 395-404.
    12. Prof. Neil D. Karunaratne, 1999. "Rival Macroeconomic Models And Australian Stylised Facts," Discussion Papers Series 261, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    13. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 837-880, September.
    14. Jean-Pascal Bénassy, 2006. "Dynamic models with non clearing markets," Working Papers halshs-00590433, HAL.
    15. Faust, Jon & Irons, John S., 1999. "Money, politics and the post-war business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 61-89, February.
    16. Dodge Cahan & Niklas Potrafke, 2021. "The Democrat-Republican presidential growth gap and the partisan balance of the state governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 577-601, December.
    17. Magda Kandil, 2001. "Variation in the Effects of Aggregate Demand Shocks: Evidence and Implications across Industrial Countries," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(3), pages 552-577, January.
    18. Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
    19. Rongrong Sun, 2014. "Nominal rigidity and some new evidence on the New Keynesian theory of the output-inflation tradeoff," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 575-597, December.
    20. Pantzalis, Christos & Stangeland, David A. & Turtle, Harry J., 2000. "Political elections and the resolution of uncertainty: The international evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(10), pages 1575-1604, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1998:i:1:p:64-82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)2325-8012 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.