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The Partisan Model Of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory And Evidence For The United States

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  • DOUGLAS A. HIBBS

Abstract

The "Partisan Theory" of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties typically weight nominal and real economic performance differently, with left-party governments being more inclined than right-party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. Given suitable assumptions about the structure of the macroeconomy, partisan models imply a political signal in demand management, output and inflation movements originating with shifts in party control of the government. In this paper I develop and test with postwar US data a revised Partisan model that allows for (i) uncertainty among policy authorities about the sustainable output growth rate and therefore about how aggregate demand expansions will be partitioned between extra output and extra inflation, and (ii) ex-post and projective learning and preference adjustment under such uncertainty. Dynamic numerical analysis of a small, stylized political-economic model based on these extensions of Partisan Theory generates within-sample forecasts that correspond remarkably well to the observed pattern of price, output and nominal spending fluctuations under the parties. Copyright 1994 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

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  • Douglas A. Hibbs, 1994. "The Partisan Model Of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory And Evidence For The United States," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 1-23, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:1-23
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    Cited by:

    1. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Amihai Glazer, 1996. "POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY -super-†," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 251-265, November.
    2. Ozkan, F Gulcin, 2000. " Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy-Making and Politics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(4), pages 621-643, December.
    3. Osterloh, Steffen, 2012. "Words speak louder than actions: The impact of politics on economic performance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 318-336.
    4. Veysel Avsar & Cem Karayalcin & Mehmet Ali Ulubasoglu, 2013. "State-owned Enterprises, Inequality, and Political Ideology," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 387-410, November.
    5. Robert Grafstein & Kiki Caruson, 2008. "Surprise party," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 315-328, October.
    6. Bruno S. Frey & Lasse Steiner, 2012. "Political Economy: Success or Failure?," Contemporary Economics, University of Finance and Management in Warsaw, vol. 6(3), September.
    7. Schmidt, Manfred G., 2001. "Parteien und Staatstätigkeit," Working papers of the ZeS 02/2001, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).
    8. Potrafke, Niklas, 2017. "Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 712-750.
    9. Gabriel Rodríguez & Alfredo Vargas, 2012. "Impacto de expectativas políticas en los retornos del Índice General de la Bolsa de Valores de Lima," Revista Economía, Fondo Editorial - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, vol. 35(70), pages 190-223.
    10. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0106003, EconWPA.
    11. Stefan Krause & Fabio Méndez, 2005. "Policy Makers' Preferences, Party Ideology, and the Political Business Cycle," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 752-767, April.
    12. Artés, Joaquín, 2014. "The rain in Spain: Turnout and partisan voting in Spanish elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 126-141.
    13. Ozkan, F Gulcin, 1998. "Partisan Business and Budget Cycles with Separate Fiscal and Monetary Authorities," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 66(2), pages 178-195, March.
    14. Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Partisan Policies, Macroeconomic Performance and Political Support," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 367-386, April.
    15. Belke, Ansgar, 2000. "Partisan Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 225-283, September.
    16. Iain McMenamin & Michael Breen & Juan Muñoz-Portillo, 2015. "Austerity and credibility in the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 45-66, March.
    17. James Cooley, 2009. "Stock Market Returns and Partisan Political Business Cycles," Departmental Working Papers 0902, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    18. Vuchelen, Jef, 1995. "Political events and consumer confidence in Belgium," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 563-579, December.
    19. Wilko Letterie & Otto Swank, 1997. "Electoral and partisan cycles between US economic performance and presidential popularity: a comment on Stephen E. Haynes," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(12), pages 1585-1592.
    20. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2003. "Political Instability, Uncertainty and Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-54, February.
    21. Damir Piplica, 2015. "Corruption and Political View Point of the Governments in Transition Countries EU Members," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(1), pages 73-87, January.

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