Telecommunications reform in developing countries after the WTO agreement on basic telecommunications services
This paper studies the main consequences and lessons of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services for economic reforms in developing countries. Our analysis emphasizes that the Agreement changed market and policy expectations about the supply, pricing, and demand growth of communications services. We show that WTO-enforced regulatory code in telecommunications (the 'Reference Paper') has considerably lowered the risks for domestic and foreign investors. One of the main conclusions of the paper is that an enforceable regulatory code can be an important tool for developing countries when reconciling the needs for policy consistency and flexibility during the introduction of competition in telecommunications. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 12 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999.
"Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty and International Economic Institutions,"
NBER Working Papers
7293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2001. "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 519-562.
- Brennan, Timothy J & Boyd, James, 1997.
"Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Constracts,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 41-54, January.
- Brennan, Timothy & Boyd, James, 1996. "Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts," Discussion Papers dp-97-02, Resources For the Future.
- Madden, Gary G & Savage, Scott J, 1997.
"CEE telecommunications investment and economic growth,"
11843, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Jul 1997.
- Madden, Gary & Savage, Scott J., 1998. "CEE telecommunications investment and economic growth," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 173-195, June.
- Janusz Ordover & Russell Pittman & Paul Clyde, 2001.
"Competition Policy for Natural Monopolies in a Developing Market Economy,"
- Janusz A. Ordover & Russell W. Pittman & Paul Clyde, 1994. "Competition policy for natural monopolies in a developing market economy 1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(3), pages 317-343, 09.
- Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998.
"The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 574-601, June.
- Maggi, G & Rodriguez-Clare, A, 1996. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Papers 180, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-46, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:265-281. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.