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Legal Institutions and Social Values: Theory and Evidence from Plea Bargaining Regimes

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  • Yehonatan Givati

Abstract

How do social values shape legal institutions across countries? To address this question I focus on one important legal institution—the use of plea bargaining in criminal cases. I develop a model in which the optimal scope of plea bargaining depends on social values. Specifically, a lower social emphasis on ensuring that innocent individuals are not punished, and a greater social emphasis on ensuring that guilty individuals are punished, lead to a greater use of plea bargaining. Using unique cross‐country data on social preferences for punishing the innocent versus letting the guilty go free, as well as an original coding of plea bargaining regimes across countries, I obtain results that are consistent with the model.

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  • Yehonatan Givati, 2014. "Legal Institutions and Social Values: Theory and Evidence from Plea Bargaining Regimes," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 867-893, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:867-893
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.12058
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    1. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2010. "Inherited Trust and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2060-2092, December.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/432sbils8u9t7qa99cii5psht1 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Paolini, Gabriele, 2023. "The administratization of criminal convictions worldwide: History, extent, and consequences," ILE Working Paper Series 74, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    4. Paolini, Gabriele & Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Elena & Voigt, Stefan, 2023. "Plea bargaining procedures worldwide: Drivers of introduction and use," ILE Working Paper Series 75, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    5. Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc, 2010. "Inherited Trust and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2060-2092, December.
    6. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, 2016. "Reducing False Guilty Pleas and Wrongful Convictions through Exoneree Compensation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 173-189.
    7. Hüschelrath, Kai & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2015. "The settlement procedure in EC cartel cases: An empirical assesment," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

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