Institutional investors, competition and corporate innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms

By adapting a well‐known model in the literature, the current paper sharpens the theoretical predictions on how competition intensity and institutional ownership interact to influence corporate innovation decisions, and adopts data from Chinese listed firms to empirically test the validity of two potential mechanisms. The split‐share reform of 2004–2005, whose timing and speed were largely beyond the firms' control, is used as a quasi‐natural experiment to address the potential endogeneity of institutional share. Similar to the existing results, we find support for the career concern mechanism rather than the lazy manager mechanism. But in addition to the complementary effects between institutional share and competition intensity on corporate innovation documented in their work, our findings also imply that competition discourages innovation when the share of institutional investors is low but encourages innovation when the institutional share is high. The opposite effects of competition on innovation with or without institutional shares is accounted for by the negative correlation between competition and innovation success, which is an assumption in our theoretical model that departs from the existing literature, but fits the reality of China's economic transition. Additional evidence relating listed firms' managerial turnover to their institutional shares is also in support of the career concern mechanism. Combined with the substantial increase in innovation after the split‐share reform, these findings demonstrate the strong positive role of institutional investors in encouraging innovation, but also offer more insight into the complex process that determines corporate innovation, especially where ownership structure is still in flux.