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PROTOCOL: Employee work motivation, effort, and performance under a merit pay system: A systematic review

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  • Cédric Velghe
  • Anders McIlquham‐Schmidt
  • Pinar Celik
  • Martin Storme
  • Stan De Spiegelaere

Abstract

This is the protocol for a Campbell systematic review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether merit pay predicts employee work motivation, effort, and performance; a second goal is to determine whether the association between merit pay and subsequent employee work motivation, effort, and performance is stronger depending on the actual relationship between the performance ratings and merit increases received, as well as on the perceived relationship by employees between their performance and their pay; a third goal is to identify whether the association between merit pay and subsequent employee motivation depends on what type of motivation is measured (i.e., intrinsic vs. extrinsic/general work motivation).

Suggested Citation

  • Cédric Velghe & Anders McIlquham‐Schmidt & Pinar Celik & Martin Storme & Stan De Spiegelaere, 2024. "PROTOCOL: Employee work motivation, effort, and performance under a merit pay system: A systematic review," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:camsys:v:20:y:2024:i:4:n:e70001
    DOI: 10.1002/cl2.70001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Konstantopoulos, Spyros, 2011. "Fixed Effects and Variance Components Estimation in Three-Level Meta-Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 5678, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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