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The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism

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  • Stephen L. Jacobson

Abstract

This study examines the effects of pay incentives on teacher absence in one New York district. Paired sample t-tests of 292 teachers revealed that teacher absence declined significantly and perfect attendance rose from 8 percent to 34 percent during the first year of an attendance incentive plan. The study also revealed that the significant reduction in sick leave was accompanied by a significant increase in the use of personal days. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen L. Jacobson, 1989. "The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 24(2), pages 280-286.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:24:y:1989:i:2:p:280-286
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    Cited by:

    1. Herrmann, Mariesa A. & Rockoff, Jonah E., 2013. "Do menstrual problems explain gender gaps in absenteeism and earnings?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 12-22.
    2. Jishnu Das & Stefan Dercon & James Habyarimana & Pramila Krishnan, 2007. "Teacher Shocks and Student Learning: Evidence from Zambia," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 42(4).
    3. Kaiser, Carl P., 1998. "What do we know about employee absence behavior? An interdisciplinary interpretation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 79-96.
    4. Billger, Sherrilyn M., 2007. "Principals as Agents? Investigating Accountability in the Compensation and Performance of School Principals," IZA Discussion Papers 2662, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Kaiser, Carl R., 1996. "Employee absence incentives in the welfare state: Toward explaining cross-national differences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 89-103.
    6. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Randy A. Ehrenberg & Daniel I. Rees & REric L. Ehrenberg, 1991. "School District Leave Policies, Teacher Absenteeism, and Student Achievement," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 26(1), pages 72-105.
    7. Mariesa A. Herrmann & Jonah E. Rockoff, 2012. "Worker Absence and Productivity: Evidence from Teaching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 749-782.
    8. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2009. "Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain," MPRA Paper 18238, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Emiliana Vegas & Ilana Umansky, 2005. "Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives : What Can We Learn from Education Reforms in Latin America?," World Bank Other Operational Studies 8694, The World Bank.
    10. Brian Jacob & Jonah E. Rockoff & Eric S. Taylor & Benjamin Lindy & Rachel Rosen, 2016. "Teacher Applicant Hiring and Teacher Performance: Evidence from DC Public Schools," NBER Working Papers 22054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Martin, Stephanie M., 2010. "The determinants of school district salary incentives: An empirical analysis of, where and why," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1143-1153, December.

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