The Effects of Pay Incentives on Teacher Absenteeism
This study examines the effects of pay incentives on teacher absence in one New York district. Paired sample t-tests of 292 teachers revealed that teacher absence declined significantly and perfect attendance rose from 8 percent to 34 percent during the first year of an attendance incentive plan. The study also revealed that the significant reduction in sick leave was accompanied by a significant increase in the use of personal days. The implications of these findings for practice and future research are discussed.
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