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¿Por qué el distanciamiento ideológico disminuye la provisión de bienes públicos?; una explicación basada en el empleo clientelar

  • Leonardo A. Gatica Arreola
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    Este artículo presenta un modelo de competencia política para analizar el efecto que tiene la distancia ideológica que hay entre dos partidos políticos que compiten por el apoyo de los ciudadanos sobre la provisión de bienes públicos. El principal resultado argumenta que la distancia ideológica entre los partidos y los ciudadanos tiene una relación negativa con la provisión de bienes públicos. En contraste con otros modelos teóricos, este resultado no se debe a problemas de cooperación o conflicto debido a la fragmentación y polarización de la ciudadanía, sino a la rentabilidad política del uso clientelar del empleo burocrático.

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    Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.

    Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 Year 2012 (June)
    Pages: 27-51

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    Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:27-51
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