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Aristocratic Equilibria: Response

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  • Cole, Harold L
  • Mailath, George J
  • Postlewaite, Andrew

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  • Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1995. "Aristocratic Equilibria: Response," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 439-443, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:2:p:439-43
    DOI: 10.1086/261990
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998. "Class systems and the enforcement of social norms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 5-35, October.
    2. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998. "The social basis of interdependent preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 779-800, May.

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