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Postcommunist Oligarchs in Russia: Quantitative Analysis

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  • Serguey Braguinsky

Abstract

The transition in Russia has not been a revolutionary jump to a market economy and democracy but an incremental process that has so far resulted in a hybrid system aptly called "oligarchic capitalism." I study the evolution of the first postcommunist oligarchy by examining the careers of the 296 most prominent first-wave postcommunist business tycoons. Forty-three percent of them were insider oligarchs deriving their status from a privileged nomenklatura background dating back to the previous regime. The rest were outsider oligarchs with no such background. Compared with insider oligarchs, outsider oligarchs were younger, better educated, and disproportionately Jewish. Their initial business successes tended to happen in sectors neglected in the planned economy, but the overwhelming majority of them subsequently developed their own special relationship with the government. It appears that instead of changing the rules of the socioeconomic game, the new entrants were themselves changed by those rules. (c) 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Serguey Braguinsky, 2009. "Postcommunist Oligarchs in Russia: Quantitative Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 307-349, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:52:y:2009:i:2:p:307-349
    DOI: 10.1086/589656
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    5. Dobler, Constanze & Hagemann, Harald, 2011. "Economic growth in the post-socialist Russian Federation after 1991: The role of Institutions," Violette Reihe: Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts "Globalisierung und Beschäftigung" 34/2011, University of Hohenheim, Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Evangelisches Studienwerk.
    6. Marandici, Ion, 2024. "Oligarchs, Political Ties and Nomenklatura Capitalism: Introducing a New Dataset," MPRA Paper 120709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Grosman, Anna & Leiponen, Aija, 2018. "Organizational transparency and power in firm ownership networks," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1158-1177.
    8. Serguey Braguinsky & Sergey Mityakov & Andrey Liscovich, 2014. "Direct Estimation of Hidden Earnings: Evidence from Russian Administrative Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 281-319.
    9. Ivanović, Vladan & Uberti, Luca J. & Imami, Drini, 2023. "Opportunistic privatization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    10. Jens K. Perret, 2014. "Religion, Growth and Innovation in Contemporary Russia," Schumpeter Discussion Papers SDP14006, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
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    12. Daniel Treisman, 2010. ""Loans for Shares" Revisited," NBER Working Papers 15819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Uberti, Luca J., 2018. "Corruption in transition economies: Socialist, Ottoman or structural?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 533-555.

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