"Loans for Shares" Revisited
The "loans for shares" scheme of 1995-6--in which a handful of well-connected businessmen bought stakes in major Russian companies--is widely considered a scandal that slowed subsequent Russian economic growth. Fifteen years later, I reexamine the details of the program. In light of evidence available today, I concur with the critics that the scheme's execution appeared corrupt. However, in most other regards the conventional wisdom was wrong. The stakes involved represented a small fraction of the market; the pricing in most cases was in line with international practice; and the scheme can only explain a small part of Russia's increasing wealth inequality. The biggest beneficiaries were not the so-called "oligarchs," but Soviet era industrial managers. After the oligarchs consolidated control, their firms performed far better than comparable state enterprises and companies sold to incumbent managers, and helped fuel Russia's rapid growth after 1999.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as “ ‘ Loans for Shares ’ Revisited,” Post - Soviet Affairs , 26, 3, July - September 2010, 207 - 27.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995.
"Privatization in the United States,"
NBER Working Papers
5113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Rober Vishny, 1995. "Privatization in the United States," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1723, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Grace, John D., 2005. "Russian Oil Supply: Performance and Prospects," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780197300305, June.
- Claude Laurin & Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, 2004. "Government Underpricing of Share-Issue Privatizations," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(3), pages 399-429, 09.
- Serguey Braguinsky, 2009. "Postcommunist Oligarchs in Russia: Quantitative Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(2), pages 307-349, 05.
- Moinov S, 1995. "Privatization in the iron and steel industry," ILO Working Papers 311759, International Labour Organization.
- Irina Denisova & Markus Eller & Timothy Frye & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007.
"Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries,"
w0105, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Denisova, Irina & Eller, Markus & Frye, Timothy & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carneiro, Dionisio Dias & Garcia, Márcio G.P., 1995. "Private international capital flows to Brazil," Financiamiento para el Desarrollo 33, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "A Normal Country: Russia After Communism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 151-174, Winter.
- Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005.
"The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism,"
- Megginson, William Leon, 2005. "The Financial Economics of Privatization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195150629, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15819. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.