IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v50y2007p323-353.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Deserters, Social Norms, and Migration

Author

Listed:
  • Dora L. Costa
  • Matthew E. Kahn

Abstract

Fourteen percent of Union Army soldiers were deserters. Were these men, who were known in their home communities to have failed cause and comrades, reintegrated into their communities? We construct a rich micropanel data set of U.S. Civil War soldiers from pro-war and anti-war communities to present new evidence on how community social norms shape soldiers’ postwar experiences. Relative to control groups, deserters were more likely to leave home, particularly if they were from pro-war communities, to move to anti-war communities and to reinvent themselves by changing their names.

Suggested Citation

  • Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2007. "Deserters, Social Norms, and Migration," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 323-353.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:50:y:2007:p:323-353
    DOI: 10.1086/511321
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/511321
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/511321?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
    3. Smith, Richard J & Blundell, Richard W, 1986. "An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit Model with an Application to Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 679-685, May.
    4. Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Kin Groups and Reciprocity: A Model of Credit Transactions in Ghana," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1730-1751, December.
    5. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2003. "Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(2), pages 519-548.
    6. Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), 2005. "Handbook of Economic Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    7. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    8. Kenneth Bollen & David Guilkey & Thomas Mroz, 1995. "Binary outcomes and endogenous explanatory variables: Tests and solutions with an application to the demand for contraceptive use in tunisia," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 32(1), pages 111-131, February.
    9. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
    10. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Economics of Green Identity or How to Get Newt and Al Gore to Hold Hands and Jointly Support Reducing GHG Emissions
      by Matthew E. Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2012-01-22 00:04:00
    2. Can Global Peer Pressure Cause a Reduction in a Nation's GHG Emissions?
      by Matthew Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2015-12-29 23:27:00
    3. The Urban and Environmental Economics of Voluntary Social Distancing
      by Matthew E. Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2020-03-12 13:51:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stelios Roupakias & Spiridoula Dimou, 2021. "Immigration, diversity and institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(3), pages 396-416, August.
    2. Dora L. Costa, 2014. "Leaders: Privilege, Sacrifice, Opportunity, and Personnel Economics in the American Civil War," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 437-462.
    3. Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2016. "Military Service and Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Colonial Punjab," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 51(4), pages 10031035-10.
    4. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2016. "Long-Term Persistence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(6), pages 1401-1436, December.
    5. Dora Costa, 2012. "Scarring and Mortality Selection Among Civil War POWs: A Long-Term Mortality, Morbidity, and Socioeconomic Follow-Up," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 49(4), pages 1185-1206, November.
    6. Dora L. Costa & Heather DeSomer & Eric Hanss & Christopher Roudiez & Sven E. Wilson & Noelle Yetter, 2017. "Union Army veterans, all grown up," Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(2), pages 79-95, April.
    7. Costa, Dora L. & Kahn, Matthew E. & Roudiez, Christopher & Wilson, Sven, 2018. "Persistent social networks: Civil war veterans who fought together co-locate in later life," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 289-299.
    8. Yamamura, Eiji, 2008. "The role of social capital in homogeneous society: Review of recent researches in Japan," MPRA Paper 11385, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 2004. "Shame and Ostracism: Union Army Deserters Leave Home," NBER Working Papers 10425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Erik O. Kimbrough & Vernon L. Smith & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1009-1039, June.
    3. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June.
    4. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    5. Bicskei, Marianna & Lankau, Matthias & Bizer, Kilian, 2016. "Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like emotions in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 17-34.
    6. Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2008. "Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 34-53, February.
    7. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions," IEW - Working Papers 059, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Frans van Winden & Mirre Stallen & K. Richard Ridderinkhof, 2008. "On the Nature, Modeling, and Neural Bases of Social Ties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-063/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    10. Ronald Bosman & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 1999. "The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-039/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. Dhami, Sanjit & Wei, Mengxing & al-Nowaihi, Ali, 2023. "Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: Theory and evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 171-196.
    12. Xiao, Erte & Houser, Daniel, 2009. "Avoiding the sharp tongue: Anticipated written messages promote fair economic exchange," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 393-404, June.
    13. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2013. "Second vs. Third Party Punishment under Costly Monitoringː A New Experimental Method and Evidence," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 6, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    14. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January.
    15. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
    16. Adrian Bruhin & Ernst Fehr & Daniel Schunk, 2019. "The many Faces of Human Sociality: Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1025-1069.
    17. Emin Karagözoğlu & Elif Tosun, 2022. "Endogenous Game Choice and Giving Behavior in Distribution Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-32, November.
    18. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 2106, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Ambrus, Attila & Pathak, Parag A., 2011. "Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 500-512.
    20. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(3), pages 482-493.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:50:y:2007:p:323-353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.