Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination: Lawyers' Looks and Lucre
The authors propose models with an ascriptive characteristic generating earnings differentials and causing sectoral sorting, allowing them to distinguish among sources producing such differentials. They use longitudinal data on a large sample of graduates from one law school and measure beauty by rating matriculation photographs. Better-looking attorneys who graduated in the 1970s earned more than others after five years of practice, an effect that grew with experience. Attorneys in the private sector are better-looking than those in the public sector, differences that rise with age. These results support theories of dynamic sorting and customer behavior. Copyright 1998 by University of Chicago Press.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sherwin Rosen, 1991.
"The Market for Lawyers,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
72, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- O'Flaherty, Siow A., 1990.
"Up Or Out Rules In The Market For Lawyers,"
1990_29, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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