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Regional Redistribution and Risk Sharing in Italy: The Role of Different Tiers of Government

Listed author(s):
  • Giampaolo Arachi
  • Caterina Ferrario
  • Alberto Zanardi

Arachi G., Ferrario C. and Zanardi A. Regional redistribution and risk sharing in Italy: the role of different tiers of government, Regional Studies. This paper provides estimates of the redistribution and risk sharing across regional jurisdictions accomplished by the public sector in Italy. In this analysis the multi-level structure of the Italian government and the financial relations which link the different tiers of government are explicitly considered. Using panel data for the period 1996-2002, it is found that public policies in Italy significantly reduce differences in per-capita gross domestic product across regions. However, the public budget, far from providing insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, greatly emphasizes income fluctuations across regions. [image omitted] Arachi G., Ferrario C. et Zanardi A. La redistribution regionale et le partage des risques en Italie: le role des divers niveaux d'administration, Regional Studies. Cet article cherche a fournir des estimations de la redistribution et du partage des risques a travers des circonscriptions d'action regionale et realises par le secteur public italien. Cette analyse approfondit la structure a niveaux multiples de l'administration italienne et examine ouvertement les rapports financiers qui relient les divers niveaux d'administration. A partir des donnees provenant des enquetes permanentes pour la periode de 1996 a 2002, il s'avere que les politiques publiques en Italie reduisent sensiblement les ecarts du PIB regional par tete. Cependant, les depenses publiques, loin de fournir une protection contre des chocs particuliers, soulignent les fluctuations du revenu a travers les regions. Politique fiscale Redistribution Partage des risques Rapports entre les niveaux d'administration Regions Arachi G., Ferrario C. und Zanardi A. Regionale Umverteilung und Risikoteilung in Italien: die Rolle der verschiedenen Regierungsebenen, Regional Studies. In diesem Beitrag schatzen wir das Ausmass der Umverteilung und Risikoteilung zwischen verschiedenen regionalen Rechtsprechungsgebieten des offentlichen Sektors in Italien. Ausdrucklich in der Analyse berucksichtigt werden die mehrschichtige Struktur der italienischen Regierung sowie die finanziellen Beziehungen, die die verschiedenen Regierungsebenen miteinander verbinden. Anhand von Paneldaten fur den Zeitraum von 1996 bis 2002 stellen wir fest, dass die offentlichen Politiken in Italien die Unterschiede des Pro-Kopf-BIP zwischen den Regionen signifikant verringern. Im offentlichen Haushalt werden die Einkommensfluktuationen innerhalb der Regionen jedoch stark betont, statt eine Absicherung gegen idiosynkratische Storungen zu gewahrleisten. Steuerpolitik Umverteilung Risikoteilung Beziehungen zwischen Regierungen Regionen Arachi G., Ferrario C. y Zanardi A. Redistribucion regional y riesgo compartido en Italia: el rol de los diferentes niveles de gobierno, Regional Studies. En este articulo ofrecemos las estimaciones de la redistribucion y el riesgo compartido en varias jurisdicciones regionales del sector publico en Italia. En este analisis se consideran expresamente la estructura multinivel del gobierno italiano y las relaciones financieras vinculadas a los diferentes estratos de gobierno. Con ayuda de datos de panel para el periodo 1996-2002 observamos que las politicas publicas en Italia reducen considerablemente las diferencias entre los niveles del PIB per capita en las regiones. Sin embargo, en el presupuesto publico, lejos de ofrecer un seguro contra los choques idiosincrasicos, se acentuan en gran medida las fluctuaciones de ingresos en las regiones. Politica fiscal Redistribucion Riesgo compartido Relaciones intergubernamentales Regiones

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Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Regional Studies.

Volume (Year): 44 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 55-69

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Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:44:y:2010:i:1:p:55-69
DOI: 10.1080/00343400802331320
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  1. Maurice Obstfeld and Giovanni Peri., 1998. "Regional Nonadjustment and Fiscal Policy: Lessons for EMU," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-096, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Luca Dedola & Stefano Usai & Marco Vannini, 1999. "An assessment of regional risk sharing in Italy and the United Kingdom," Chapters,in: Economic Growth and Change, chapter 15 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  3. Pierfederico Asdrubali & Bent E. Sørensen & Oved Yosha, 1996. "Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1081-1110.
  4. Buettner, Thiess, 2002. "Fiscal federalism and interstate risk sharing: empirical evidence from Germany," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 195-202, January.
  5. Gaimpaolo Arachi & Alberto Zanardi, 2004. "Designing Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Some Insights from the Recent Italian Reform," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 25(3), pages 325-365, September.
  6. Linda Andersson, 2004. "Regional Risk-sharing Provided by the Fiscal System: Empirical Evidence from Sweden," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 269-280.
  7. Giorgio Brosio & Federico Revelli, 2003. "The political economy of regional opting out: distributive implications of a prospective Europe of Regions," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 127-142, August.
  8. Decressin, Jorg, 2002. "Regional income redistribution and risk sharing: how does Italy compare in Europe?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 287-306, November.
  9. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
  10. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R., 1995. "Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 253-274, February.
  11. Maurice Obstfeld & Giovanni Peri, 1998. "Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 205-259, April.
  12. Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
  13. Melitz, Jacques & Zumer, Frederic, 2002. "Regional redistribution and stabilization by the center in Canada, France, the UK and the US:: A reassessment and new tests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 263-286, November.
  14. Agustín Maravall & Ana del Río, 2001. "Time Aggregation and the Hodrick-Prescott Filter," Working Papers 0108, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
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