IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/regstd/v40y2006i8p875-887.html

Devolution and the Interregional Inequalities in Health and Healthcare in Spain

Author

Listed:
  • Joan Costa-Font
  • Ana Rico

Abstract

Costa-Font J. and Rico A. (2006) Devolution and the interregional inequalities in health and healthcare in Spain, Regional Studies 40, 875-887. The desirability of devolution of government responsibilities is often questioned on the grounds of regional cohesion concerns. This feature is especially relevant in welfare policy areas such as healthcare services given their impact on an individual's well-being. This paper examines the effects of health system devolution on the emergence of inter-territorial inequalities in healthcare outcomes (mortality) and outputs (healthcare expenditure) in the Spanish National Health System (NHS). Based on an empirical model for regional health expenditure, and drawing from a battery of inequality indicators (some taken from previous studies, other estimated anew), the following results are obtained. First, healthcare devolution has not led to an expansion of regional inequalities in healthcare outcomes and outputs. Second, there is no clear-cut evidence that devolution increases public health expenditure (in real terms) in devolved region-states, with the exception of fiscally accountable autonomous communities (ACs). Finally, regional health expenditure is explained by differences in need and higher reliance healthcare inputs use, size effects as well as the region-specific economic and demographic dimension in addition to regional income. Costa-Font J. et Rico A. (2006) La regionalisation et les inegalites de sante et des services medicaux en Espagne, Regional Studies 40, 875-887. Souvent on remet en question les avantages de la regionalisation des competences gouvernementales en raison des questions qui se posent quant a la cohesion regionale. Cela est particulierement pertinent dans le domaine des politiques en faveur des services medicaux, etant donne leur impact sur le bien-etre de l'individu. Cet article cherche a examiner les retombees de la regionalisation des services de sante sur la naissance des inegalites des resultats des services medicaux (mortalite) et des rendements (depenses de sante) dans la Securite Sociale espagnole. A partir d'un modele econometrique des depenses de sante, et puisant dans une batterie d'indices d'inegalite (dont certains proviennent des etudes anterieures et dont d'autres sont de nouvelles estimations), on obtient les resultats suivants. Primo, la regionalisation des services medicaux n'a entraine un creusement des inegalites regionales ni des resultats, ni des rendements des services medicaux. Secundo, il reste a prouver que la regionalisation augmente les depenses de sante publique (en termes reels), a l'exception des AC qui sont fiscalement autonomes. Pour conclure, on explique les depenses de sante regionales en termes du besoin et de l'utilisation des facteurs medicaux dont on depend davantage, des effets de taille ainsi que des dimensions economique et demographique specifiques d'une region en plus du revenu regional. Inegalites regionales Interactions politiques Responsabilite politique Secu Costa-Font J. und Rico A. (2006) Dezentralisierung und die von Region zu Region zu beobachtenden Unterschiede der Gesundheit und Gesundheitsfursorge in Spanien, Regional Studies 40, 875-887. Auf Grund der Besorgnis um regionale Kohasion fragt man sich oft, ob die Dezentralisierung der Regierungsverantwortlichkeit wunschenswert ist. In Anbetracht der Auswirkung auf das Wohlergehen individueller Personen betrifft dieser Aspekt besonders Aufgabengebiete derWohlfahrtspolitik, wie z.B. Gesundheitsfursorge. DieserAufsatz untersucht die Wirkung der Dezentralisierung des Gesundheitswesens auf von Region zu Region beobachteten Unterschieden in den Ergebnissen der Gesundheitsfursorge (Sterblichkeit) und Aufwand (Ausgaben fur Gesundheitsfursorge) im Gesundheitswesen des spanischen Staates (NHS). Gestutzt sowohl auf ein empirisches Modell fur regionale Gesundheitsausgaben als auch eine Reihe Unterschiedsindikatoren (manche fruheren Studien entnommen, andere von neueren Berechnungen) werden folgende Ergebnisse erzielt:erstens, dass die Dezentralisierung der Gesundheitsfursorge nicht zu einer Ausweitung regionaler Unterschiede der Ergebnisse der Gesundheitsfursorge gefuhrt hat, und zweitens sich keine eindeutigen Beweise ergaben, dass Dezentralisierung die Ausgaben fur das offentliche Gesundheitswesen mit Ausnahme des finanziell verantwortlichen AC in zentralierten Regionalstaaten (effektiv)gestiegen sind. Abschliessend werden regionale Ausgaben fur das Gesundheitswesen zusatzlich regionler Einkommen durch Unterschiede in Bedarf und grosserem Verlass auf Inanspruchnahme des Gesundheitsfursorgeaufwands, durch Grosseneffekte sowie spezifische wirtschaftliche und demographische Dimensionen erklart. Regionale Unterschiede Politische Wechselwirkungen Politische Verantwortlichkeit NHS Costa-Font J. y Rico A. (2006) Transferencia de competencias y las desigualdades interregionales en la salud y la atencion sanitaria en Espana, Regional Studies 40, 875-887. A menudo se cuestiona la conveniencia de la transferencia de las competencias del gobierno porque se teme que peligre la cohesion regional. Esta cuestion es especialmente relevante en temas de la politica del bienestar tales como los servicios de atencion sanitaria, puesto que tienen mucho impacto en el bienestar del individuo. En este articulo examinamos que efectos ha tenido la transferencia de competencias del sistema de la salud en cuanto a la aparicion de desigualdades interterritoriales en los resultados de la atencion sanitaria (mortalidad) y la inversion (gasto de la atencion sanitaria) en el sistema de la Seguridad Social en Espana. Basandonos en un modelo empirico para el gasto de la salud en las comunidades autonomas y segun una bateria de indicadores de desigualdades (algunos extraidos de estudios previos, y otros de calculos nuevos), obtenemos los siguientes resultados. Primero, la transferencia de la competencia de atencion sanitaria no ha llevado a una expansion de las desigualdades regionales en los resultados y las inversiones. Segundo, no hay pruebas claras de que la transferencia de competencias aumente el gasto de la salud publica (en terminos reales) en los estados regionales con las competencias transferidas con la excepcion de una contabilidad fiscalmente responsable. Para terminar, el gasto de la salud en las comunidades autonomas se explica por las diferencias en las necesidades y una mayor dependencia de la atencion sanitaria, los efectos del tamano asi como la dimension economica y demografica de la region en cuestion, ademas de los ingresos regionales. Desigualdades regionales Interacciones politicas Responsabilidad politica Seguridad Social

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Costa-Font & Ana Rico, 2006. "Devolution and the Interregional Inequalities in Health and Healthcare in Spain," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(8), pages 875-887.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:40:y:2006:i:8:p:875-887
    DOI: 10.1080/00343400600984346
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00343400600984346
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00343400600984346?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    3. Kevin Morgan, 2001. "The New Territorial Politics: Rivalry and Justice in Post-devolution Britain," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(4), pages 343-348.
    4. Federico Revelli, 2001. "Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error mimicking?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(9), pages 1101-1107.
    5. Federico Revelli, 2002. "Testing the taxmimicking versus expenditure spill-over hypotheses using English data," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(14), pages 1723-1731.
    6. Joan Costa-Font & Ana Rico, 2006. "Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 477-498, September.
    7. Joan Costa & Jaume Garcia, 2003. "Demand for private health insurance: how important is the quality gap?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(7), pages 587-599, July.
    8. Guillem López & Joan Costa-Font & Ivan Planas, 2004. "Diversity and regional inequalities: Assessing the outcomes of the Spanish 'System of Health Care Services'," Working Papers, Research Center on Health and Economics 745, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    9. Costa-Font, J. & Hernandez-Quevedo, C., 2013. "Inequalities in Self-Reported Health: A Meta-Regression Analysis," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 13/05, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1987. "The economics of the local public sector," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 11, pages 571-645, Elsevier.
    11. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty & Emmanuelle Reulier, 2005. "Choix d'imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales. Un test sur les départements français," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(1), pages 67-93.
    2. Joan Costa‐Font & Jordi Pons‐Novell, 2007. "Public health expenditure and spatial interactions in a decentralized national health system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(3), pages 291-306, March.
    3. Bordignon, Massimo & Cerniglia, Floriana & Revelli, Federico, 2003. "In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 199-217, September.
    4. Maarten Allers & J. Elhorst, 2005. "Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 493-513, August.
    5. Sandy Fréret & Denis Maguain, 2017. "The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1100-1140, December.
    6. Massimo Bordignon & Floriana Cerniglia & Federico Revelli, 2002. "In Search for Yardstick Competition: Property Tax Rates and Electoral Behavior in Italian Cities," CESifo Working Paper Series 644, CESifo.
    7. Geys, Benny, 2006. "Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 443-462, November.
    8. Johan Lundberg, 2021. "Horizontal interactions in local personal income taxes," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 67(1), pages 27-46, August.
    9. Małkowska, Agnieszka & Telega, Agnieszka & Głuszak, Michał & Marona, Bartłomiej, 2021. "Spatial diversification of property tax policy – Searching for yardstick competition in Polish metropolitan areas," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    10. Francisco J. Delgado & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Matías Mayor, 2015. "On The Determinants Of Local Tax Rates: New Evidence From Spain," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 351-368, April.
    11. Eric Dubois & Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty, 2007. "The Effects of Politics on Local Tax Setting: Evidence from France," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 44(8), pages 1603-1618, July.
    12. Lyytikäinen, Teemu, 2012. "Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from a property tax reform in Finland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(7-8), pages 584-595.
    13. Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito & Maria-Dolores Guillamon, 2019. "Tax mimicking in Spanish municipalities: expenditure spillovers, yardstick competition, or tax competition?," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 43(2), pages 115-139.
    14. repec:hal:cesptp:hal-00800688 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Keith Blackburn & Gareth Downing, 2015. "Deconcentration, Corruption and Economic Growth," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 209, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    16. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2013. "Identifying local tax mimicking: Administrative borders and a policy reform," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 157, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    17. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Les stratégies fiscales des collectivités locales. De la théorie à la réalité," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 94(3), pages 283-315.
    18. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2014. "Identifying local tax mimicking with administrative borders and a policy reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 41-51.
    19. Lyytikäinen, Teemu, 2012. "Tax competition among local governments: Evidence from a property tax reform in Finland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(7-8), pages 584-595.
    20. Barbara ERMINI & Raffaella SANTOLINI, 2007. "Horizontal Interaction on Local Councils' Expenditures. Evidence from Italy," Working Papers 278, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    21. Cassette, Aurélie & Paty, Sonia, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 78.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:regstd:v:40:y:2006:i:8:p:875-887. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRES20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.