Management response to the demands of global fresh fruit markets: Rewarding harvesters with financial incentives
Competition in global fresh fruit markets is now much more intense than a decade ago. Producers and exporters face an increasing number of quality requirements and regulations that are costly and challenge established practices: paying harvesters by the amount they harvest and trying to control quality with sanctions. Based on a field study, this article discusses how lemon producers in northern Argentina are responding to these challenges; why some have responded only by introducing non-contractual innovations, while others by rewarding harvesters for careful performance to insure fruit quality. The findings elucidate arguments about the instrumentality of transaction costs on the choice of both managerial practices and forms of remunerating labourers. It also illustrates that added quality demands of foreign markets eased the task of harvesters, but had a varying effect on labourers' income.
Volume (Year): 42 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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