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The Design of Subprime Mortgage-backed Securities and Information Insensitivity

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  • Sunyoung Park

Abstract

What is the securitization process for? What exactly happened in the subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) market from the housing boom to the global financial crisis? To answer these questions, I use a novel hand-collected dataset of subprime MBSs issued between 2004 and 2007, which includes a detailed description of underlying mortgage characteristics and deal structures. This paper studies the purpose of the securitization process in the context of the subprime MBS market as a trigger of the global financial crisis. I find that the credit enhancements reflect the credit risks of underlying collaterals, thus ex-ante qualities of AAA subprime MBS tranches had not been deteriorated. In addition, the AAA tranche spreads are mostly explained by the bond market conditions and uncorrelated with the credit risk of collateral. This results suggest that market participants designed and priced the subprime MBSs in the way that the AAA tranche could be information insensitive. In other words, the securitization process makes it possible that market participants have less incentive to learn about the underlying collateral information.

Suggested Citation

  • Sunyoung Park, 2013. "The Design of Subprime Mortgage-backed Securities and Information Insensitivity," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(2), pages 249-284, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:27:y:2013:i:2:p:249-284
    DOI: 10.1080/10168737.2013.796115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "The changing nature of financial intermediation and the financial crisis of 2007-09," Staff Reports 439, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Gorton, Gary B., 2010. "Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199734153.
    3. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 603-618, September.
    4. Ashcraft, Adam B. & Schuermann, Til, 2008. "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 191-309, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Allen, Franklin & Barbalau, Adelina, 2024. "Security design: A review," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    2. Gauthier, Laurent, 2019. "Securitization Structures and Security Design," MPRA Paper 95168, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Katerina Ivanov, 2021. "Credit Enhancement Mechanism in Loan Securitization and Its Implication to Systemic Risk," Discussion Paper Series 2021-01, McColl School of Business, Queens University of Charlotte.

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