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Un modèle théorique d'intermédiation : transmission et gestion des chocs

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    () (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

Abstract

We propose a simple theoretical model with a financial system characterized by a given intermediation scheme, which depends on the importance of households credits in banks' balance sheets and total outstanding credits. The central bank is characterized by a monetary policy rule including an augmented Taylor type rule, and liquidity injections and assets purchases functions. We show that the intermediation scheme determines the conditions of the transmission of a shock on a particular market segment. This results in two key conclusions. First, it highlights that the importance given by central banks to the output gap in the Taylor rule de facto affects financial stability, for a given intermediation scheme. Second, how the interest rate risk is shared between banks and borrowers determines the modalities for monetary policy. If the borrowers bear an excessive proportion of this risk, any official interest rate positive shock can deteriorate financing conditions in such a way that the central bank will have to engage the full range of its monetary policy tools.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Bastidon, 2013. "Un modèle théorique d'intermédiation : transmission et gestion des chocs," Post-Print hal-00806524, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00806524
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00806524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Modèle d'intermédiation; crédits aux ménages; Banques centrales; amplification des chocs financiers;

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