IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Un modèle théorique d'intermédiation : transmission et gestion des chocs

  • Cécile Bastidon


    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - UTLN - Université de Toulon)

We propose a simple theoretical model with a financial system characterized by a given intermediation scheme, which depends on the importance of households credits in banks' balance sheets and total outstanding credits. The central bank is characterized by a monetary policy rule including an augmented Taylor type rule, and liquidity injections and assets purchases functions. We show that the intermediation scheme determines the conditions of the transmission of a shock on a particular market segment. This results in two key conclusions. First, it highlights that the importance given by central banks to the output gap in the Taylor rule de facto affects financial stability, for a given intermediation scheme. Second, how the interest rate risk is shared between banks and borrowers determines the modalities for monetary policy. If the borrowers bear an excessive proportion of this risk, any official interest rate positive shock can deteriorate financing conditions in such a way that the central bank will have to engage the full range of its monetary policy tools.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00806524.

in new window

Date of creation: 10 Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Atelier de travail "Retour à la stabilité financière", GDRE Monnaie Banque Finance, Apr 2013, Paris, France
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00806524
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. John C. Williams & John B. Taylor, 2009. "A Black Swan in the Money Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 58-83, January.
  2. Boivin, Jean & Kiley, Michael T. & Mishkin, Frederic S., 2010. "How Has the Monetary Transmission Mechanism Evolved Over Time?," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 8, pages 369-422 Elsevier.
  3. Jean Paul Pollin, 2009. "Pour une révision du procès fait à Alan Greenspan," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 87-93.
  4. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2009. "Does central bank communication really lead to better forecasts of policy decisions? New evidence based on a Taylor rule model for the ECB," KOF Working papers 09-236, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  5. John Taylor & John Williams, 2008. "Further Results on a Black Swan in the Money Market," Discussion Papers 07-046, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  6. Mésonnier, J-S. & Renne, J-P., 2004. "Règle de Taylor et politique monétaire dans la zone euro," Working papers 117, Banque de France.
  7. Ben S. Bernanke & Vincent Reinhart & Brian P. Sack, 2004. "Monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound: an empirical assessment," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-48, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Grégory Levieuge & Alexis Penot, 2008. "The Fed and the ECB: Why such an apparent difference in reactivity?," Post-Print halshs-00239381, HAL.
  9. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1995. "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission," NBER Working Papers 5146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
  11. Grégory Levieuge & Alexis Penot, 2008. "The FED and the ECB: Why Such an Apparent Difference in Reactivity?," Post-Print halshs-00328582, HAL.
  12. Boutillier, M. & Bricongne, J.C., 2012. "Disintermediation or financial diversification? The case of developed countries," Working papers 380, Banque de France.
  13. Stephan Sauer & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2007. "Using Taylor Rules to Understand European Central Bank Monetary Policy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 375-398, 08.
  14. Vasco Cúrdia & Michael Woodford, 2009. "Credit frictions and optimal monetary policy," BIS Working Papers 278, Bank for International Settlements.
  15. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
  16. Cukierman Alex & Muscatelli Anton, 2008. "Nonlinear Taylor Rules and Asymmetric Preferences in Central Banking: Evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-31, February.
  17. Grégory Levieuge & Alexis Penot, 2008. "The Fed and the ECB: Why Such an Apparent Difference in Reactivity ?," Post-Print halshs-00364537, HAL.
  18. Peter N. Ireland, 2000. "Money's Role in the Monetary Business Cycle," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 458, Boston College Department of Economics.
  19. Christian Bordes & Laurent Clerc, 2010. "L'art du central banking de la BCE et le principe de séparation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 120(2), pages 269-302.
  20. Charles Goodhart, 2007. "Whatever became of the Monetary Aggregates?," FMG Special Papers sp172, Financial Markets Group.
  21. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Xavier Freixas & José Jorge, 2007. "The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing," Economics Working Papers 1027, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
  23. Grégory Levieuge & Alexis Penot, 2008. "THE FED and the ECB: Why Such an Apparent Difference in Reactivity?," Post-Print halshs-00328561, HAL.
  24. Vítor, Castro, 2011. "Can central banks' monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a nonlinear rule?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 228-246, December.
  25. Cécile BASTIDON GILLES & Nicolas HUCHET & Philippe GILLES, 2012. "Amplification Effects and Unconventional Monetary Policies," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(2(567)), pages 13-30, February.
  26. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "The changing nature of financial intermediation and the financial crisis of 2007-09," Staff Reports 439, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  27. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  28. Berndt, Antje & Gupta, Anurag, 2009. "Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 725-743, July.
  29. Grégory Levieuge & Alexis Penot, 2008. "The FED and the ECB: Why Such an Apparent Difference in Reactivity?," Post-Print halshs-00328549, HAL.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00806524. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.