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'Never on a Sunday': Economic incentives and short-term sick leave in Sweden

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  • Daniela Andren

Abstract

Using a longitudinal data for about 1800 persons observed between 1986 and 1991, this study investigates the incentive effects on short-term sickness spells of two important regime changes in the social insurance system in Sweden implemented in 1987 and 1991. The results indicate that the rules influenced people's decisions about when to report the beginning and ending of sickness spells. The 1991 reform, which reduced the replacement rate, had a stronger effect on reducing the duration of short-term absences than the 1987 reform, which restricted the payment of sickness cash benefit to only scheduled workdays.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Andren, 2005. "'Never on a Sunday': Economic incentives and short-term sick leave in Sweden," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 327-338.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:37:y:2005:i:3:p:327-338
    DOI: 10.1080/0003684042000295287
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Broström, Göran & Palme, Mårten & Johansson, Per, 2002. "Economic incentives and gender differences in work absence behavior," Working Paper Series 2002:14, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    2. Jye Lu & Gouri Bhattacharyya, 1990. "Some new constructions of bivariate Weibull models," Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Springer;The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, vol. 42(3), pages 543-559, September.
    3. Magnus Henrekson & Mats Persson, 2004. "The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 87-114, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Weiss, 2008. "Sick Leave and the Composition of Work Teams," MEA discussion paper series 07149, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
    2. Daniela Andrén, 2007. "Long-term absenteeism due to sickness in Sweden. How long does it take and what happens after?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 8(1), pages 41-50, March.
    3. Andrén, Daniela, 2008. ""To array a man's will against his sickness is the supreme art of medicine". An analysis of multiple spells of sickness," Working Papers in Economics 294, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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