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A Game Theoretic Approach to Assess the Impacts of Major Investments on Transboundary Water Resources: The Case of the Euphrates and Tigris

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  • Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu

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Abstract

There are varying and inconsistent claims among countries sharing the same river basins. While upstream countries are asserting that they regulate flows through built-up reservoirs (enabling flood prevention) and reduce seasonal flow variations (providing water during drought seasons), downstream countries criticize upstream countries for excessive withdrawals and declining annual flows. Behind the scene, almost every basin country unilaterally envisions of ambitious projects demanding extensive water withdrawals for their prospective development and growth. This study establishes a methodology to measure the rational economic and political impacts of extensive reservoir projects throughout a basin, using the case of the Euphrates and Tigris. This methodology uses both linear programming applications calculating country and coalition benefits, and game theory concepts (core and Shapley value) for evaluating the impacts of reservoirs. The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Model (ETRBM) is extended by adding the time dimension. In conjunction with time, reservoir capacities are incorporated into the model as a new set of parameters enabling resources allocations over multiple periods. In a rational economic view, the existence of reservoirs, while providing certain advantages in allocating water overtime, provides varying geopolitical powers to upstream and downstream basin countries. As a result of model applications, it is observed that basin-wide coalitions may potentially eliminate construction of excessive reservoir capacities, and, therefore, unnecessary investment costs and evaporation losses. It is also observed that assuming the absence of downstream reservoirs, the upstream reservoirs provide significant, first, economic benefit to the all forms of coalitions with upstream country and associated parties and, second, power to the country having the reservoirs in any coalition scenario. However, again in a game theoretic perspective, the power of upstream countries looses some of its weight when downstream reservoirs are incorporated. During drought years, the availability of reservoirs ensures extensive core solutions and encourages a grand coalition among all parties. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Suggested Citation

  • Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu, 2009. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Assess the Impacts of Major Investments on Transboundary Water Resources: The Case of the Euphrates and Tigris," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 23(15), pages 3069-3099, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:23:y:2009:i:15:p:3069-3099
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-009-9424-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eleni Kampragou & Eleni Eleftheriadou & Yannis Mylopoulos, 2007. "Implementing Equitable Water Allocation in Transboundary Catchments: The Case of River Nestos/Mesta," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 21(5), pages 909-918, May.
    2. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu & Jean-Michel Guldmann, 2004. "International water resources allocation and conflicts: the case of the Euphrates and Tigris," Environment and Planning A, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 36(5), pages 783-801, May.
    3. Mahan, Robert C. & Horbulyk, Theodore M. & Rowse, John G., 2002. "Market mechanisms and the efficient allocation of surface water resources in southern Alberta," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 25-49, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Küçükmehmetoğlu & Ali Büyükgöz, 2013. "Consensus Building Via Cooperative Game Theory In The Process Of Urban Redevelopment," ERSA conference papers ersa13p565, European Regional Science Association.
    2. Mojtaba Sadegh & Najmeh Mahjouri & Reza Kerachian, 2010. "Optimal Inter-Basin Water Allocation Using Crisp and Fuzzy Shapley Games," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(10), pages 2291-2310, August.
    3. Armaghan Abed-Elmdoust & Reza Kerachian, 2012. "Water Resources Allocation Using a Cooperative Game with Fuzzy Payoffs and Fuzzy Coalitions," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 26(13), pages 3961-3976, October.
    4. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu, 2011. "AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH BETWEEN GAME THEORY AND PARETO FRONTIER CONCEPTS FOR THE TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATIONS: Case of the Euphrates and Tigris," ERSA conference papers ersa10p899, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Zhisong Chen & Huimin Wang & Xiangtong Qi, 2013. "Pricing and Water Resource Allocation Scheme for the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(5), pages 1457-1472, March.
    6. Elahe Fallah-Mehdipour & Omid Bozorg Haddad & Soheila Beygi & Miguel Mariño, 2011. "Effect of Utility Function Curvature of Young’s Bargaining Method on the Design of WDNs," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 25(9), pages 2197-2218, July.
    7. Shawei He & Keith Hipel & D. Kilgour, 2014. "Water Diversion Conflicts in China: A Hierarchical Perspective," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(7), pages 1823-1837, May.
    8. Kaveh Madani & Keith Hipel, 2011. "Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 25(8), pages 1949-1977, June.
    9. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu & Abdurrahman Geymen, 2012. "Transboundary Water Resources Allocation Under Various Parametric Conditions: The Case Of The Euphrates & Tigris River Basin," ERSA conference papers ersa12p613, European Regional Science Association.
    10. Hasan Torabi Pudeh & Ramin Mansouri & Amir Hamzeh Haghiabi & Hojatt Allah Yonesi, 2016. "Optimization of Hydraulic-Hydrologic Complex System of Reservoirs and Connecting Tunnel," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(14), pages 5177-5191, November.
    11. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu & Abdurrahman Geymen, 2014. "Transboundary Water Resources Allocation under Various Parametric Conditions: The Case of the Euphrates & Tigris River Basin," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(11), pages 3515-3538, September.
    12. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu, 2011. "Energy And Agricultural Policies Over The Transboundary Surface Water Resources," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1183, European Regional Science Association.
    13. Xiqin Wang & Yuan Zhang & Yong Zeng & Changming Liu, 2013. "Resolving Trans-jurisdictional Water Conflicts by the Nash Bargaining Method: A Case Study in Zhangweinan Canal Basin in North China," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(5), pages 1235-1247, March.
    14. Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu & Weijun He & Liang Yuan & Jian Hua Zhao, 2016. "Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(12), pages 4451-4466, September.
    15. Zhenliang Liao & Phillip Hannam, 2013. "The Mekong Game: Achieving an All-win Situation," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(7), pages 2611-2622, May.
    16. Ben Li & Guangming Tan & Gang Chen, 2016. "Generalized Uncooperative Planar Game Theory Model for Water Distribution in Transboundary Rivers," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(1), pages 225-241, January.

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