IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/waterr/v25y2011i8p1949-1977.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts

Author

Listed:
  • Kaveh Madani
  • Keith Hipel

Abstract

In game theory, potential resolutions to a conflict are found through stability analysis, based on stability definitions having precise mathematical structures. A stability definition reflects a decision maker’s behavior in a conflict or game, predicts how the game is played, and suggests the resolutions or equilibria of the dispute. Various stability definitions, reflecting different types of people with different levels of foresight, risk attitude, and knowledge of opponents’ preferences, have been proposed for resolving games. This paper reviews and illustrates six stability definitions, applicable to finite strategy strategic non-cooperative water resources games, including Nash Stability, General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited-Move Stability, and Non-Myopic Stability. The introduced stability definitions are applied to an interesting and highly informative range of generic water resources games to show how analytical results vary based on the applied stability definitions. The paper suggests that game theoretic models can better simulate real conflicts if the applied stability definitions better reflect characteristics of the players. When there is a lack of information about the types of decision makers, the employment of a range of stability definitions might improve the strategic results and provide useful insights into the basic framework of the conflict and its resolution. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Suggested Citation

  • Kaveh Madani & Keith Hipel, 2011. "Non-Cooperative Stability Definitions for Strategic Analysis of Generic Water Resources Conflicts," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 25(8), pages 1949-1977, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:25:y:2011:i:8:p:1949-1977
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-011-9783-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11269-011-9783-4
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11269-011-9783-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Raquel Salazar & Ferenc Szidarovszky & Abraham Rojano, 2010. "Water Distribution Scenarios in the Mexican Valley," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(12), pages 2959-2970, September.
    3. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Fang, Liping & Hipel, Keith W. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 1989. "Conflict models in graph form: Solution concepts and their interrelationships," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 86-100, July.
    5. Mehmet Kucukmehmetoglu, 2009. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Assess the Impacts of Major Investments on Transboundary Water Resources: The Case of the Euphrates and Tigris," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 23(15), pages 3069-3099, December.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2002. "Why Social Preferences Matter -- The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 1-33, March.
    7. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    8. Augusto Getirana & Valéria Malta & José Azevedo, 2008. "Decision Process in a Water Use Conflict in Brazil," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 22(1), pages 103-118, January.
    9. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    10. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers 084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Duckstein, Lucien & Bogardi, Istvan, 1984. "Multiobjective management of mining under water hazard by game theory," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 251-258, February.
    12. Dinar, Ariel & Wolf, Aaron, 1994. "Economic potential and political considerations of regional water trade: The Western Middle East example," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 335-356, November.
    13. Augusto Getirana & Valéria de Fátima Malta, 2010. "Investigating Strategies of an Irrigation Conflict," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(12), pages 2893-2916, September.
    14. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
    15. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P. & Broseta, Bruno, 1998. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1vn4h7x5, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhenliang Liao & Phillip Hannam, 2013. "The Mekong Game: Achieving an All-win Situation," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 27(7), pages 2611-2622, May.
    2. Michal Bauer & Julie Chytilová & Barbara Pertold-Gebicka, 2014. "Parental background and other-regarding preferences in children," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 24-46, March.
    3. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2021. "Interpreting the Will of the People: A Positive Analysis of Ordinal Preference Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Sandro Ambuehl & B. Douglas Bernheim, 2021. "Social preferences over ordinal outcomes," ECON - Working Papers 395, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2024.
    5. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December.
    6. Matthew P. Taylor, 2017. "Information Acquisition Under Risky Conditions Across Real And Hypothetical Settings," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 352-367, January.
    7. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020. "The development of social strategic ignorance and other regarding behavior from childhood to adulthood," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    8. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Cadsby, C. Bram & Song, Yang, 2007. "Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 213-239, May.
    9. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Guillermo Moloche & Stephen Weinberg, 2006. "Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1043-1068, September.
    10. Hu, Yingyao & Kayaba, Yutaka & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 215-231.
    11. Veronica Rattini, 2023. "Worker autonomy and performance: Evidence from a real‐effort experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 300-327, April.
    12. Guidon Fenig & Giovanni Gallipoli & Yoram Halevy, 2018. "Piercing the 'Payoff Function' Veil: Tracing Beliefs and Motives," Working Papers tecipa-619, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    13. Devetag, Giovanna & Warglien, Massimo, 2003. "Games and phone numbers: Do short-term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 189-202, April.
    14. Healy, Paul J. & Park, Hyoeun, 2023. "Model selection accuracy in behavioral game theory: A simulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    15. Vincent P. Crawford, 2006. "Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000462, UCLA Department of Economics.
    16. Li, Yan & Ye, Hang & Zhang, Hong, 2016. "Evolution of cooperation driven by social-welfare-based migration," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 445(C), pages 48-56.
    17. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2014. "On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 102-125.
    18. Engwerda, J.C., 2007. "Multicriteria Dynamic Optimization Problems and Cooperative Dynamic Games," Other publications TiSEM c7941fef-278b-42ca-a6b8-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Gerber, Anke & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2010. "Iterated reasoning and welfare-enhancing instruments in the centipede game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(1-2), pages 123-136, May.
    20. Carmen Herrero & Juan Moreno-Ternero & Giovanni Ponti, 2010. "On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 145-179, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:25:y:2011:i:8:p:1949-1977. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.