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Capital Markets Union in Europe: Why Other Unions Must Lead the Way

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  • Viral V. Acharya

    (New York University, Stern School of Business)

  • Sascha Steffen

    (University of Mannheim)

Abstract

Summary Government bond markets in the Euro Area are highly fragmented causing further fragmentation in bond and equity markets. Capital Markets Union with fully integrated capital markets across member countries can only work when the status of member country sovereign bonds as risk-free assets is restored. Banking Union and fiscal union are both required for this outcome. However, the Banking Union remains an unfinished project without an European deposit insurance framework and there is little consensus at the moment for a fiscal union in the Euro Area. It appears thus that the fate of the Capital Markets Union solely rests with the European Central Bank in the near to medium term.

Suggested Citation

  • Viral V. Acharya & Sascha Steffen, 2016. "Capital Markets Union in Europe: Why Other Unions Must Lead the Way," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 152(4), pages 319-329, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjecst:v:152:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03399431
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03399431
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral V. & Imbierowicz, Björn & Steffen, Sascha & Teichmann, Daniel, 2020. "Does the lack of financial stability impair the transmission of monetary policy?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(2), pages 342-365.
    2. Matteo Crosignani, 2015. "Why Are Banks Not Recapitalized During Crises?," Working Papers 203, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    3. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    4. Viral Acharya & Itamar Drechsler & Philipp Schnabl, 2014. "A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2689-2739, December.
    5. Buch, Claudia M. & Koetter, Michael & Ohls, Jana, 2016. "Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-15.
    6. Acharya, Viral & Pierret, Diane & Steffen, Sascha, 2016. "Lender of last resort versus buyer of last resort: The impact of the European Central Bank actions on the bank-sovereign nexus," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-019, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marius Clemens & Stefan Gebauer & Tobias König, 2020. "The Macroeconomic Effects of a European Deposit (Re-) Insurance Scheme," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1873, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Jakub Danko & Erik Suchý, 2021. "The Financial Integration in the European Capital Market Using a Clustering Approach on Financial Data," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-19, June.
    3. Paul J.J. Welfens & Samir Kadiric, 2017. "Neuere Finanzmarktaspekte von Bankenkrise, QE-Politik und EU-Bankenaufsicht," EIIW Discussion paper disbei239, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G01; G15; F34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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