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Does the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance reduce investors’ short-termism?

Author

Listed:
  • Yongtae Kim

    (Santa Clara University)

  • Lixin (Nancy) Su

    (Lingnan University)

  • Xindong (Kevin) Zhu

    (City University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

The practice of providing quarterly earnings guidance has been criticized for encouraging investors to fixate on short-term earnings and encouraging managerial myopia. Using data from the post–Regulation Fair Disclosure period, we examine whether the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance reduces short-termism among investors. We show that, after guidance cessation, investors in firms that stop quarterly guidance are composed of a larger (smaller) proportion of long-term (short-term) institutions, put more (less) weight on long-term (short-term) earnings in firm valuation, become more (less) sensitive to analysts’ long-term (short-term) earning forecast revisions, and are less likely to dismiss chief executive officers for missing quarterly earnings targets by small amounts, relative to investors in firms that continue to issue quarterly earnings guidance. Our study provides new evidence of the benefit of stopping quarterly earnings guidance, that is, the reduction of short-termism among investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Yongtae Kim & Lixin (Nancy) Su & Xindong (Kevin) Zhu, 2017. "Does the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance reduce investors’ short-termism?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 715-752, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:22:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11142-017-9397-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11142-017-9397-z
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    2. Małgorzata Janicka & Aleksandra Pieloch-Babiarz & Artur Sajnóg, 2020. "Does Short-Termism Influence the Market Value of Companies? Evidence from EU Countries," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-22, November.
    3. Wang, Qiong & Qiu, Muqing, 2023. "Minority shareholders' activism and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Chen, Yangyang & Ge, Rui & Zolotoy, Leon, 2017. "Do corporate pension plans affect audit pricing?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 322-337.
    5. Kosheek Sewchurran & Johan Dekker & Jennifer McDonogh, 2019. "Experiences of Embedding Long-Term Thinking in an Environment of Short-Termism and Sub-par Business Performance: Investing in Intangibles for Sustainable Growth," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 997-1041, July.
    6. Lin, K.C., 2017. "Quality concerns over managers' quarterly earnings guidance," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 113-125.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voluntary disclosure; Earnings guidance; Management forecasts; Investor short-termism; Managerial myopia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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