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The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft

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  • Alex Edmans
  • Mirko S. Heinle
  • Chong Huang

Abstract

This article shows that improving financial efficiency may reduce real efficiency. While the former depends on the total amount of information available, the latter depends on the relative amounts of hard and soft information. Disclosing more hard information (e.g., earnings) increases total information, raising financial efficiency and reducing the cost of capital. However, it induces the manager to prioritize hard information over soft by cutting intangible investment to boost earnings, lowering real efficiency. The optimal level of financial efficiency is non-monotonic in investment opportunities. Even if low financial efficiency is desirable to induce investment, the manager may be unable to commit to it. Optimal government policy may involve upper, not lower, bounds on financial efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Edmans & Mirko S. Heinle & Chong Huang, 2016. "The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2151-2182.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:20:y:2016:i:6:p:2151-2182.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfw030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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