Applying cooperative game theory to power relations
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References listed on IDEAS
- Rothschild, Kurt W., 2002. "The absence of power in contemporary economic theory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 433-442.
- Bartlett,Randall, 1989. "Economics and Power," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521355629, April.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:57:y:1963:i:03:p:632-642_24 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gomez, Daniel & Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique & Manuel, Conrado & Owen, Guillermo & del Pozo, Monica & Tejada, Juan, 2003. "Centrality and power in social networks: a game theoretic approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-54, August.
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- Le Cadre, Hélène & Barth, Dominique & Pouyllau, Hélia, 2011. "QoS commitment between vertically integrated autonomous systems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(3), pages 627-643, November.
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KeywordsShapley value; Coalition functions; Norms; Violence; Power; Power-over; Market power; Emotional dependence; Communication structure;
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