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A mathematical theory of power

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  • Daniele De Luca

Abstract

This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to cooperate. We can then define actual and potential power as special relations between different states of the system.

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  • Daniele De Luca, 2024. "A mathematical theory of power," Papers 2401.16406, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.16406
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    References listed on IDEAS

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