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A three-pronged simonesque approach to modeling and simulation in deviant “bi-pay” auctions, and beyond

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  • Joe Johnson

  • Naveen Govindarajulu

  • Selmer Bringsjord

Abstract

In order to employ and exhibit our Simon-inspired approach to computational economics, and specifically defend our version of the view that even logically untrained humans are rational, albeit no more than “boundedly” so, we provide two models, both rooted in computational logic, of how it is that logically untrained humans perform in a seemingly irrational fashion in a particular “deviant” auction (the bi-pay auction). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Joe Johnson & Naveen Govindarajulu & Selmer Bringsjord, 2014. "A three-pronged simonesque approach to modeling and simulation in deviant “bi-pay” auctions, and beyond," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 13(1), pages 59-82, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:minsoc:v:13:y:2014:i:1:p:59-82
    DOI: 10.1007/s11299-014-0141-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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