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Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory

Author

Listed:
  • Vadim Cherepanov

    ()

  • Tim Feddersen

    ()

  • Alvaro Sandroni

    ()

Abstract

In warm glow models, an agent may prefer one alternative but aspire to choose another. The agent chooses her aspiration if she gets a sufficiently large warm glow payoff for acting as she aspires. This basic framework is widely used in models of turnout in elections and contributions to public goods, but is often criticized for being ad hoc. In this paper, we provide choice-theoretic foundations for warm glow theory. We characterize the empirical content of warm glow theory, show how to infer the core elements of the model from data and show that it is possible to predict behavior even when preferences and aspirations are not revealed. Our results provide support for assumptions often made in the literature and suggest new applications for warm glow models. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Vadim Cherepanov & Tim Feddersen & Alvaro Sandroni, 2013. "Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 501-535, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:501-535
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0733-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Silke Boenigk & Marcel Lee Mayr, 2016. "The Happiness of Giving: Evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel That Happier People Are More Generous," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1825-1846, October.
    2. Hans Keiding & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Revealed smooth nontransitive preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 463-484, November.
    3. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," CEPR Discussion Papers 10178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Georgios Gerasimou, 2016. "Partially dominant choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 127-145, January.
    5. repec:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:935-956 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Warm glow; Revealed preferences; Aspirations; Choice; D01; D63; D71; D74;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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