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A cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for the concave facility location game

Author

Listed:
  • Gaidi Li

  • Yu Li

  • Jia Shu

  • Dachuan Xu

Abstract

In this paper, we present a cost-sharing scheme for the concave facility location game by exploring the concavity structure. We show that it is cross-monotonic and competitive, and recovers 1/3 fraction of the total cost. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Gaidi Li & Yu Li & Jia Shu & Dachuan Xu, 2013. "A cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for the concave facility location game," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1325-1334, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jglopt:v:56:y:2013:i:4:p:1325-1334
    DOI: 10.1007/s10898-012-9852-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hervé Moulin & Scott Shenker, 2001. "Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs:budget balance versus efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(3), pages 511-533.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lindong Liu & Xiangtong Qi & Zhou Xu, 2016. "Computing Near-Optimal Stable Cost Allocations for Cooperative Games by Lagrangian Relaxation," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 28(4), pages 687-702, November.
    2. Fengmin Wang & Dachuan Xu & Chenchen Wu, 2016. "Combinatorial approximation algorithms for the robust facility location problem with penalties," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 483-496, March.

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