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Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: Do people discriminate between genders?

Author

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  • Valerio Capraro

    (Middlesex University London)

  • Hélène Barcelo

    (Mathematical Science Research Institute)

Abstract

Do people discriminate between men and women when they have the option to punish defectors or reward cooperators? Here, we report on four pre-registered experiments that shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N = 544) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they have the option to punish (reward) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with third-party punishment/reward. Study 2 (N = 253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding: participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator on a scale of 1–5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. Study 3a (N = 331) and Study 3b (N = 310) conceptually replicate Study 2 with a slightly different gender manipulation. These latter studies show that, in situations where they do not have specific beliefs about the gender of the defector/cooperator’s partner, neither men nor women discriminate between genders.

Suggested Citation

  • Valerio Capraro & Hélène Barcelo, 2021. "Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: Do people discriminate between genders?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 19-32, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:7:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-021-00099-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s40881-021-00099-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Ketian & Liu, Yang & Chen, Xiaojie & Szolnoki, Attila, 2022. "Evolution of trust in a hierarchical population with punishing investors," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    2. Valerio Capraro & Andrea Vanzo & Antonio Cabrales, 2022. "Playing with words: Do people exploit loaded language to affect others’ decisions for their own benefit?," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 17(1), pages 50-69, January.
    3. repec:cup:judgdm:v:17:y:2022:i:1:p:50-69 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Punishment; Reward; Cooperation; Gender;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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