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Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

Author

Listed:
  • Aditya Bhan

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

  • Tarun Kabiraj

    (Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

The present work is the first to formally model inter-outfit strategic cooperation in a manner which reveals that the cooperating terror outfits may conduct more, less or the same number of attacks as in the absence of cooperation; based on whether they are resource-constrained or not a priori; and on the extent to which cooperation can serve to ease such a constraint through inter-outfit resource-transfer. In the absence of external sponsorship, the paper shows that strategic cooperation between two outfits has no impact on terror activity if neither outfit is resource-constrained a priori. If only one outfit is resource-constrained a priori, on the other hand, then inter-group cooperation increases terror activity if and only if there is sufficient resource-asymmetry between the outfits. Further, if both outfits are resource-constrained a priori, then cooperation may increase or decrease terror activity depending on parametric asymmetries. Finally, it is demonstrated that while cooperation can neutralize the impact of strategic external sponsorship on terror activity and thereby remove the incentive for its provision, minor modifications to the sponsorship mechanism can often mitigate this phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Aditya Bhan & Tarun Kabiraj, 2020. "Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1085-1106, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09696-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09696-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary A. Ackerman & Jun Zhuang & Sitara Weerasuriya, 2017. "Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(2), pages 342-371, February.
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    5. Aditya Bhan & Tarun Kabiraj, 2019. "Operational externalities and counter-terrorism," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 171-187, June.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terror outfit; Terror attacks; Non-cooperative competition; Outfit cooperation; External sponsorship; Counter-terrorism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other

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