IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity


  • Bhan, Aditya
  • Kabiraj, Tarun


The paper shows that in the absence of external sponsorship, strategic cooperation between two outfits has no impact on terror activity, if neither outfit is resource-constrained a priori. If only one outfit is resource-constrained a priori, inter-group cooperation increases terror activity if and only if there is sufficient resource-asymmetry between the outfits. Further, if both outfits are resource-constrained a priori, then cooperation may increase or decrease terror activity, depending on parametric asymmetries. Finally, it is demonstrated that while cooperation can neutralize the impact of strategic external sponsorship on terror activity and thereby remove the incentive for its provision, there is always some external sponsorship mechanism which can be utilized to enhance terror activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhan, Aditya & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2020. "Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity," MPRA Paper 98484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:98484

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Terror outfit; Terror attacks; Non-cooperative competition; Outfit cooperation; Sponsorship fund; Counter terrorism;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:98484. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.