IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficient Multi-Attribute Negotiation with Incomplete Information


  • Guoming Lai

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Cuihong Li

    (University of Connecticut 2100)

  • Katia Sycara

    (Mellon University)


Multi-attribute negotiation is an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements in real-world situations. It allows the possibility of reaching “win-win” solutions for both parties, who trade off different attributes in a solution. Existing research on multi-attribute negotiations has mainly focused on the situations when negotiation parties have complete information about each other's preference. This paper presents a model with incomplete information, while considering Pareto-efficiency and computational efficiency. A non-biased mediator, who applies query learning to maintain near Pareto-efficiency without heavy computation, is adopted in the model. In addition, the mediating mechanism proposed in the model overcomes the difficulty of preference elicitation which usually arises in the preliminary step of a multi-attribute negotiation. Our model also reduces the negotiation complexity by decomposing the original n-dimensional negotiation space into a sequence of negotiation base lines. Agents can negotiate upon a base line with rather simple strategies. The experimental results show that near Pareto-efficient agreements can be reached effectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Guoming Lai & Cuihong Li & Katia Sycara, 2006. "Efficient Multi-Attribute Negotiation with Incomplete Information," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 15(5), pages 511-528, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:15:y:2006:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-006-9041-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-006-9041-y

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL:
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 1999. "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 956-975, August.
    3. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1999. "Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 561-575.
    4. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    5. Lang, Kevin & Rosenthal, Robert W, 2001. "Bargaining Piecemeal or All at Once?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 526-540, July.
    6. Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 125-134, March.
    7. Harri Ehtamo & Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Pirja Heiskanen & Jeffrey Teich & Markku Verkama & Stanley Zionts, 1999. "Generating Pareto Solutions in a Two-Party Setting: Constraint Proposal Methods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(12), pages 1697-1709, December.
    8. Sycara, Katia P., 1990. "Negotiation planning: An AI approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 216-234, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Jorge E. Hernández & Raúl Poler & Josefa Mula & Francisco C. Lario, 2011. "The Reverse Logistic Process of an Automobile Supply Chain Network Supported by a Collaborative Decision-Making Model," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 79-114, January.
    2. Xiaoqin Shelley Zhang & Victor Lesser, 2013. "Meta-level Coordination for Solving Distributed Negotiation Chains in Semi-cooperative Multi-agent Systems," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 681-713, July.
    3. Paula Sarabando & Luís C. Dias & Rudolf Vetschera, 2013. "Mediation with Incomplete Information: Approaches to Suggest Potential Agreements," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 561-597, May.
    4. Eskesen, Anita, 2021. "A contract design perspective on balancing the goals of utility regulation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    5. Fabian Lang & Andreas Fink, 2015. "Learning from the Metaheuristics: Protocols for Automated Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 299-332, March.
    6. Homberger, Jörg & Fink, Andreas, 2017. "Generic negotiation mechanisms with side payments – Design, analysis and application for decentralized resource-constrained multi-project scheduling problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(3), pages 1001-1012.
    7. Jorge E. Hernández & Josefa Mula & Raúl Poler & Andrew C. Lyons, 2014. "Collaborative Planning in Multi-tier Supply Chains Supported by a Negotiation-Based Mechanism and Multi-agent System," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 235-269, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guoming Lai & Katia Sycara, 2009. "A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 169-187, March.
    2. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
    3. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    4. Louta, Malamati & Roussaki, Ioanna & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2008. "An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 187(3), pages 1327-1345, June.
    5. Flamini, Francesca, 2007. "First things first? The agenda formation problem for multi-issue committees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 138-157, May.
    6. In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004. "Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
    7. Sgobbi, Alessandra & Carraro, Carlo, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 8224, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    8. Radzvilas, Mantas, 2016. "Hypothetical Bargaining and the Equilibrium Selection Problem in Non-Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 70248, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. May Tajima & Niall M. Fraser, 2001. "Logrolling Procedure for Multi-Issue Negotiation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 217-235, May.
    10. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    11. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Marie-Claire Villeval & Manfred Konigstein, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations," Working Papers 0508, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    13. Chakravorty Shourjo, 2019. "Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-12, January.
    14. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel De Lara & Héctor Ramírez Cabrera, 2011. "Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoffs," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-7, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    15. Samuel Danthine & Noemí Navarro, 2013. "How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(4), pages 2840-2850.
    16. Navarro, Noemí & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2020. "On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 117-145.
    17. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
    18. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2002. "Endogenous bargaining power," Economics Working Papers 644, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    19. Acharya, Avidit & Ortner, Juan, 2013. "Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2150-2163.
    20. Tai-Wei Hu & Guillaume Rocheteau & Lucie Lebeau & Younghwan In, 2018. "Gradual Bargaining in Decentralized Asset Markets," 2018 Meeting Papers 606, Society for Economic Dynamics.


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:15:y:2006:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-006-9041-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.