IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/endesu/v27y2025i4d10.1007_s10668-023-04278-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of power dynamics on international climate commitments: a case study of the USA–Iran over climate action and economic sanctions

Author

Listed:
  • Aylin Javadi

    (Kharazmi University)

Abstract

This research brings a fresh approach by employing a game theoretic analysis of the US–Iran confrontation, based on a sanctions game model in the normal form introduced by Tsebelis (JCR 30:3–28, 1990), to investigate the intertwined factors of power dynamics and economic sanctions on Iran’s hesitancy in ratifying the Paris agreement, with a particular focus on the implications for climate cooperative efforts. The study’s findings demonstrated that Iran’s preferred outcome involves the lifting of US sanctions, along with the ratification of the Paris agreement and adherence to its unconditional NDC commitments. In contrast, the USA appears to favour maintaining sanctions on Iran, while Iran unofficially ratifies the Paris agreement. Having indicated that its ratification is contingent upon receiving international financial assistance and technology transfer, Iran strategically utilizes the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a means to achieve either the relief of US sanctions or conditional ratification of the Paris agreement, driven by concerns regarding its vulnerable economy. This study also highlights the significant concerns regarding the impact of US power dynamics on Iran’s international climate commitments and how imbalances of power can hinder the implementation of climate commitments and sustainable development.

Suggested Citation

  • Aylin Javadi, 2025. "The impact of power dynamics on international climate commitments: a case study of the USA–Iran over climate action and economic sanctions," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 9609-9628, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:27:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s10668-023-04278-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10668-023-04278-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10668-023-04278-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10668-023-04278-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tian, Huifang & Whalley, John, 2010. "Trade sanctions, financial transfers and BRIC participation in global climate change negotiations," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-63, January.
    2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    3. Morteza Ghomi, 2022. "Who is afraid of sanctions? The macroeconomic and distributional effects of the sanctions against Iran," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 395-428, July.
    4. Festré, Agnès & Garrouste, Pierre, 2014. "Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 141-153.
    5. Jon Hovi & Tora Skodvin & Steinar Andresen, 2003. "The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(4), pages 1-23, November.
    6. Joyeeta Gupta, 2016. "Climate change governance: history, future, and triple‐loop learning?," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 192-210, March.
    7. Forgo, Ferenc & Fulop, Janos & Prill, Maria, 2005. "Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 252-267, January.
    8. Kaveh Madani, 2021. "Have International Sanctions Impacted Iran’s Environment?," World, MDPI, vol. 2(2), pages 1-22, April.
    9. Ciscar, Juan Carlos & Soria, Antonio, 2002. "Prospective analysis of beyond Kyoto climate policy: a sequential game framework," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(15), pages 1327-1335, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chen, W.T. & Li, Y.P. & Huang, G.H. & Chen, X. & Li, Y.F., 2010. "A two-stage inexact-stochastic programming model for planning carbon dioxide emission trading under uncertainty," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 1033-1047, March.
    2. Forgo, Ferenc & Fulop, Janos & Prill, Maria, 2005. "Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 252-267, January.
    3. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, February.
    5. He, Shawei & Marc Kilgour, D. & Hipel, Keith W., 2017. "A general hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution with application to greenhouse gas emission disputes between USA and China," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(3), pages 919-932.
    6. Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
    7. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink & Ekko Ierland, 2010. "Renegotiations in the Greenhouse," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 573-596, April.
    8. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    9. David M. McEvoy & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2011. "The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 475-498, July.
    10. Na Li Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, 2008. "Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-Wide Targets," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(1), pages 97-114.
    11. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00796708, HAL.
    12. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo & Alistair Ulph, 2014. "International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion," Department of Economics Working Papers 19/14, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    13. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements and Trading Blocks - Can issue linkage enhance cooperation?," Discussion Paper Series 2018_07, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Jun 2018.
    14. Thoron, Sylvie & Sol, Emmanuel & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1271-1282, December.
    15. Konstantinos Georgalos & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2020. "Nash versus coarse correlation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1178-1204, December.
    16. Martinico-Perez, Marianne Faith G. & Schandl, Heinz & Fishman, Tomer & Tanikawa, Hiroki, 2018. "The Socio-Economic Metabolism of an Emerging Economy: Monitoring Progress of Decoupling of Economic Growth and Environmental Pressures in the Philippines," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 155-166.
    17. Rogna, Marco & Vogt, Carla J., 2021. "Accounting for inequality aversion can justify the 2° C goal," Ruhr Economic Papers 925, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    18. Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 2004. "Economic and environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 229-248, September.
    19. Patrick Criqui & Denise Cavard, 2004. "Economic approach to climate policies and stakes of international negotiations," Post-Print halshs-00003793, HAL.
    20. Christopher Pallas & Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "NGO monitoring and the legitimacy of international cooperation: A strategic analysis," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:27:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s10668-023-04278-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.