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Taxes Versus Tradable Permits Considering Public Environmental Awareness

Author

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  • Xiaoyan Wang

    (Nanjing University of Finance and Economics)

  • Weiwei Zhang

    (Chongqing Technology and Business University)

Abstract

This paper examines the relative performance of taxes and tradable permits when public environmental awareness is taken into account in policy-making. Two sovereign regions linked by a transboundary pollutant are considered. We show when public environmental awareness in one region increases, domestic government tightens its policy setting. While for foreign government, its response is different in these two polices. Under taxes, foreign government relaxes tax rate to get a free ride; under tradable permits, it may also tighten permit supply to benefit more from the international tradable permit market. But anyway, total pollution emissions are reduced. Moreover, when public environmental awareness in one region is sufficiently large, tradable permits welfare dominates taxes. However, public environmental awareness is bounded in reality. So, we further narrow its range to match reality. It is shown for the case of global externalities, tradable permits policy is superior. While for the case of reciprocal externalities, taxes policy is superior when pollution spillover is relatively low. And with the rise of public environmental awareness, the advantage of taxes is further strengthened.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoyan Wang & Weiwei Zhang, 2022. "Taxes Versus Tradable Permits Considering Public Environmental Awareness," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 293-315, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ediscc:v:6:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s41885-022-00108-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s41885-022-00108-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental policy; Taxes; Tradable permits; Public environmental awareness; Transboundary pollution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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