IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sgh/gosnar/y2016i6p43-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Determinanty wynagrodzeń członków rad nadzorczych w bankach notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie

Author

Listed:
  • Agata Wieczorek

Abstract

Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja czynników determinujących wynagrodzenie osób w radach nadzorczych banków notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie. Badanie czynników determinujących poziom wynagrodzenia członków rad nadzorczych zostało przeprowadzone na próbie panelowej obejmującej 1034 obserwacje. Dla potrzeb badania wykorzystano model ekonometryczny zawierający trzy grupy zmiennych objaśniających, reprezentujących standardy nadzoru korporacyjnego, indywidualne cechy osób nadzorujących oraz wyniki i uwarunkowania ekonomiczne. Badanie wykazało, że wśród zmiennych nadzoru korporacyjnego mających istotny wpływ na poziom wynagrodzenia członków rad nadzorczych była liczba komitetów, w jakich członkowie zasiadają, pakiet akcji w rękach zarówno akcjonariusza strategicznego, jak i samych członków rad nadzorczych. Indywidualne cechy kierownictwa okazały się istotne przy ustalaniu poziomu wynagrodzeń członków rad nadzorczych. Zajmowane stanowisko a także pełniona funkcja były dodatnio skorelowane z poziomem wynagrodzenia. Również staż pracy na stanowisku członka rady nadzorczej w danym banku wpływał pozytywnie na wynagrodzenie. Przeprowadzona analiza wykazała, że wyniki i uwarunkowania ekonomiczne są czynnikami branymi pod uwagę przy określaniu poziomu wynagrodzenia. Wielkość banku, mierzona za pomocą wartości aktywów, jest dodatnio skorelowana z poziomem wynagrodzenia. Stopa zwrotu z aktywów, zarówno z okresu bieżącego, jak i z okresu wcześniejszego oraz wskaźnik zadłużenia, okazały się statystycznie istotne.

Suggested Citation

  • Agata Wieczorek, 2016. "Determinanty wynagrodzeń członków rad nadzorczych w bankach notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 6, pages 43-68.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2016:i:6:p:43-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.journalssystem.com/gna/pdf-100768-33165
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger & Stulz, René M., 2011. "Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 11-26, January.
    2. John, Teresa A & John, Kose, 1993. "Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 949-974, July.
    3. Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2014. "Bank Bonuses and Bailouts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 259-288, February.
    4. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30, April.
    5. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg, 1999. "Looking beyond the CEO: executive compensation at banks," Staff Reports 68, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Chen, Carl R. & Steiner, Thomas L. & Whyte, Ann Marie, 2006. "Does stock option-based executive compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 915-945, March.
    7. Peter Hahn & Meziane Lasfer, 2011. "The compensation of non-executive directors: rationale, form, and findings," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(4), pages 589-601, November.
    8. Lazarus Angbazo & Ranga Narayanan, 1997. "Top Management Compensation and the Structure of the Board of Directors in Commercial Banks," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 1(2), pages 239-259.
    9. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    10. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 2010. "CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 64-76, January.
    11. repec:fth:prinin:248 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    13. repec:cdl:anderf:qt9kp0t5q9 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Robert Gibbons & Kevin Murphy, 1989. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," Working Papers 628, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    15. Livne, Gilad & Markarian, Garen & Milne, Alistair, 2011. "Bankers' compensation and fair value accounting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1096-1115, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wieczorek, Agata, . "Determinanty wynagrodzeń członków rad nadzorczych w bankach notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2016(6).
    2. Lin Guo & Abu Jalal & Shahriar Khaksari, 2015. "Bank executive compensation structure, risk taking and the financial crisis," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 609-639, October.
    3. Dong, Gang Nathan, 2014. "Excessive financial services CEO pay and financial crisis: Evidence from calibration estimation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 75-96.
    4. Ying Yan, 1998. "The FDICIA and bank CEOs' pay-performance relationship: an empirical investigation," Working Papers (Old Series) 9805, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    5. Dragan Ilić & Sonja Pisarov & Peter S. Schmidt, 2019. "Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-25, December.
    6. Timothy King & Jonathan Williams, 2013. "Bank Efficiency and Executive Compensation," Working Papers 13009, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    7. Shah, Syed Zulfiqar Ali & Akbar, Saeed & Liu, Jia & Liu, Ziyu & Cao, Sichen, 2017. "CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1489-1503.
    8. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2016. "CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 264-273.
    10. Sonja Daltung & Vittoria Cerasi, 2006. "Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring," FMG Discussion Papers dp576, Financial Markets Group.
    11. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Shackell, Margaret B., 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation," Research Papers 1679, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    12. Stavros Kourtzidis & Nickolaos G. Tzeremes, 2019. "Investigating the determinants of firm performance," European Journal of Management and Business Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 29(1), pages 3-22, June.
    13. Cerasi, Vittoria & Daltung, Sonja, 2006. "Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24634, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    15. Słomka-Gołębiowska, Agnieszka & Urbanek, Piotr, 2016. "Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 203-220.
    16. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    17. Otten, Jordan J.A. & Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R, 2007. "Extending the managerial power theory of executive pay: A cross national test," MPRA Paper 6778, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2001. "Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 133-161, January.
    19. Hagendorff, Jens & Vallascas, Francesco, 2011. "CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1078-1095, September.
    20. Taye Mengistae & Lixin Colin Xu, 2004. "Agency Theory and Executive Compensation: The Case of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 615-638, July.
    21. Jarque, Arantxa & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2020. "Banker compensation, relative performance, and bank risk," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2016:i:6:p:43-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Grzegorz Konat (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sgwawpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.