An Empirical Analysis of the SEC's 1992 Proxy Reforms on Executive Compensation
We examine the SEC's 1992 proxy reforms that expanded the amount of information about executive pay that is required to be disclosed in corporate proxy statements and permitted shareholders to file proxy proposals about executive compensation. Using a sample of executive compensation proposals filed against 64 firms during 1992-1995. We find that the stock market reaction to the reforms suggest that they imposed significant political costs on firms, without offsetting benefits to shareholders in the form of improved monitoring. We also find that the proposal filing decision primarily reflects populist political concerns about pay policies, but that voting outcomes primarily reflect shareholder concerns about the degree of incentive alignment provided by the firm's compensation contracts.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015|
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Murphy, Kevin J., 1997. "Executive compensation and the Modern Industrial Revolution1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 417-425, July.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1996. "Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 365-395, November.
- repec:sae:ilrrev:v:43:y:1990:i:3:p:30-51 is not listed on IDEAS
- DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1991. "Union negotiations and corporate policy *1: A study of labor concessions in the domestic steel industry during the 1980s," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 3-43, November.
- Lewellen, Wilbur G. & Park, Taewoo & Ro, Byung T., 1996. "Self-serving behavior in managers' discretionary information disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 227-251, April.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1991. "Time, Salary, and Incentive Payoffs in Labor Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 25-44, January.
- Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J., 1993. "Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 3-23, April.
- Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990.
"Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
- Denis, David J & Denis, Diane K, 1995. " Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1057, September.
- Choi, Stephen, 2000. "Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 233-68, April.
- Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, 1996.
"Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 165-182, Spring.
- Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose & Catherin D. Wolfram, 1994. "Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry," NBER Working Papers 4980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sloan, Richard G., 1993. "Accounting earnings and top executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 55-100, April.
- Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan, 1988. "Withdrawn Security Offerings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(02), pages 119-133, June.
- Gordon, Lilli A & Pound, John, 1993. " Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 697-718, June.
- Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J. & Smith, Abbie, 1996. "CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 161-193, April.
- Steven Huddart, 1993. "The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(11), pages 1407-1421, November.
- Palepu, Krishna G., 1986. "Predicting takeover targets : A methodological and empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-35, March.
- Kim, Oliver & Suh, Yoon, 1993. "Incentive efficiency of compensation based on accounting and market performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 25-53, April.
- Baber, William R. & Janakiraman, Surya N. & Kang, Sok-Hyon, 1996. "Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 297-318, June.
- Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1679. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.