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The Tragedy of the Anticommons in Knowledge

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  • Yi Zhou

Abstract

The anticommons in knowledge is distinct from the anticommons in physical objects. The former is always tragic, the latter not necessarily so. For society at large, the tragedy of the anticommons is more serious when it involves knowledge than when it involves physical resources. Buchanan and Yoon’s (2000) formal model of the anticommons is incorrect even within the neoclassical context, and their neoliberal suggestion that single ownership is the socially optimal solution to the tragedy of the knowledge anticommons is misleading. This article argues that the only, epistemically and socially beneficial solution to the tragedy of the knowledge anticommons is to create, expand, and protect the knowledge commons. The article also constructs a simple formal model based on Bessen and Maskin’s (2006) sequential model, as a metaphor for how the comedy of the knowledge commons works. The analysis supports the worldwide movement for free knowledge, and dissents from the evolving political and academic consensus in China in favor of more restrictive intellectual property regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Yi Zhou, 2016. "The Tragedy of the Anticommons in Knowledge," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 48(1), pages 158-175, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:48:y:2016:i:1:p:158-175
    DOI: 10.1177/0486613415586992
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    knowledge; anticommons tragedy; knowledge commons;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B59 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Other
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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