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Power Sharing and Reform Capacity

Author

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  • Johannes Lindvall

    (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK, johannes.lindvall@politics.ox.ac.uk)

Abstract

In this paper I argue that reform capacity, defined as the extent to which political institutions facilitate the adoption of socially efficient reforms, is not primarily determined by the number of veto players in the political system, but by the availability of institutional mechanisms that allow political agents to solve commitment problems associated with bargaining over reform. Specifically, I argue that power sharing is compatible with high reform capacity if policy areas involved in package deals are all controlled by the central government (or whatever level of government makes the reform), and if the ‘losers’ are confident that they will remain veto players in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Lindvall, 2010. "Power Sharing and Reform Capacity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 359-376, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:22:y:2010:i:3:p:359-376
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629810369524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bäck, Hanna & Lindvall, Johannes, 2015. "Commitment Problems in Coalitions: A New Look at the Fiscal Policies Of Multiparty Governments," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 53-72, January.

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