The Bosman Case: Effects of the Abolition of the Transfer Fee
A league benefits from signing a contract that makes compensation compulsory to a team that loses its player on the expiry of his contract. This article analyzes the consequences of impeding such contracts between teams, as in the Bosman case, settled by the European Court of Justice in 1995. It is argued that smaller teams will sell their talent before the expiry of their contracts with the players to be able to bargain for a transfer fee from the recruiting team. Consequently, the quality of the leagues decreases.
Volume (Year): 1 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:203-218. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.