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The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions

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  • Jongryn Mo

    (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

This article attempts to formalize and extend Putnam's conjecture that greater domestic constraints can be a bargaining advantage in international negotiations by means of a more realistic model of negotiator behavior. Unlike her counterpart in Putnam, the negotiator in my model has a direct interest, not coincident with those of her domestic constituents, in the bargaining outcome. She also has more leeway in domestic bargaining in that not all domestic constituents have veto power. The results of the analysis show that the relationship between the negotiator's domestic constraints and the bargaining outcome is more complex than Putnam's analysis suggests. The negotiator can be either better or worse off under greater domestic constraints. The conditions under which these different outcomes result depend on the distribution of political power between the negotiator and domestic constituents.

Suggested Citation

  • Jongryn Mo, 1994. "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(3), pages 402-422, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:38:y:1994:i:3:p:402-422
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038003003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    3. Mayer, Frederick W., 1992. "Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 793-818, October.
    4. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    5. Tsebelis, George, 1988. "Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 145-170, April.
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    2. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.
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    4. Simon Hug & Thomas König, 2007. "Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 105-113, June.
    5. Dluhosch Barbara, 2010. "The Second-Mover Advantage in International Trade Negotiations," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-37, February.
    6. Jean-Pierre P. Langlois & Catherine C. Langlois, 2004. "Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 261-293, April.
    7. John S. Odell, 2003. "Making and Breaking Impasses in International Regimes. The WTO, Seattle and Doha," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 1, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
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