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Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective

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  • Kyungkook Kang

    (University of Central Florida, USA)

  • Jacek Kugler

    (Claremont Graduate University, USA)

Abstract

This paper explores the stability of deterrence in East Asia and the effects of missile defense on regional security. In particular, we evaluate the policy implications derived from the power transition perspective for the development of the US missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the short term, we anticipate that the stability of deterrence in East Asia will be increased by the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that creates a power preponderance of satisfied challengers against potential regional challengers. The long-term horizon is, however, tenuous because the rapid expansion of US-led missile defense systems may significantly alter the trajectory of China’s missile strategy by increasing its dissatisfaction with the status quo. One fundamental implication is that, without further restrictions, long-term deployment stability in East Asia will become increasingly fragile.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyungkook Kang & Jacek Kugler, 2015. "Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 280-296, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:intare:v:18:y:2015:i:3:p:280-296
    DOI: 10.1177/2233865915595762
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Carsten Rauch, 2017. "A tale of two power transitions: Capabilities, satisfaction, and the will to power in the relations between the United Kingdom, the United States, and Imperial Germany," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 201-222, September.

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